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Essays on Open Economy Macroeconomics
Seunghoon Na
This Ph.D. dissertation contains three essays on Open Economy Macroeconomics. The first
chapter investigates monetary policy problem of emerging economies known as the Tos˘ovsky´
Dilemma, which says that when an emerging economy experiences a boom associated with
capital inflows and exchange rate appreciation, it is not appealing to tighten monetary policy
to counteract inflationary pressures as this might further exacerbate inflows and appreciation.
In the chapter, I develop an intertemporal general equilibrium framework of the monetary
transmission mechanism to investigate how this dilemma shapes optimal monetary policy.
In the model, financing is decentralized and collateralized by physical capital, which is non-
tradable and costly to adjust over time. The Dilemma materializes when there is a positive
external shock that increases capital inflows and generates real exchange rate appreciation
and inflation in the nontradable sector, all of which are inefficient. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, the Ramsey optimal monetary policy calls for lowering the policy rate in such cir-
cumstances in order to suppress capital inflows and appreciation, while accepting inflation
in the nontradable sector. If the capital flows can be controlled by an additional policy
instrument, then optimal policy becomes countercyclical, as in the conventional framework
without the Dilemma.
The second and third chapters focus on dynamics of labor shares over the business cycles
in small open economies. The second chapter uses annual labor shares data of 40 years for 35
small open economy countries and finds three empirical regularities. First, labor shares are
not constant, but they are as volatile as output. Second, labor shares in emerging economies
are about twice as volatile as labor shares in advanced economies. Third, labor shares in
emerging economies are procyclical on average, whereas they are countercyclical in most
advanced economies. The empirical findings offer a skeptical view of the conventional beliefs
about the unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and countercyclical
labor shares in the short-run.
The third chapter paper builds a theoretical model which can comprehensively explain
the empirical findings in the second chapter. The model is a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium, small open economy, composed of tradable and nontradable sectors with CES
production functions. In the model, there are two margins of labor share fluctuations over
the business cycles, which are fluctuations of the capital-labor ratio in each sector and
fluctuations in the relative value of sectoral production. The estimated models show a
countercyclical labor share and volatility near that of output in Canada, and procyclical and
excessively volatile labor share in Mexico, all of which are in line with the data.
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Chapter 1
A Theory of the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma
1.1 Introduction
In emerging economies business cycles, economic booms are typically associated with capital
inflows and real exchange rate appreciation. The inflows and appreciation are thought to be
excessive, endangering economic and financial stability, thus motivating a need for appro-
priate policy intervention. This feature constraints possible monetary policy reactions for
stabilizing domestic inflation. Policymakers often argue that during an economic boom, a
monetary policy intended to reduce inflationary pressure, such as tightening the domestic
interest rate, can encourage further capital inflows and real appreciation which are not desir-
able. This policy dilemma is sometimes referred to as the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma, named after
the former governor of Czech National Bank, Josef Tos˘ovsky´. Tos˘ovsky´ was concerned about
expansionary capital surges in transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe during the
mid-1990s that constrained the ability of the countries to tighten interest rates in order to
reduce domestic inflation (see Lipschitz, Lane, and Mourmouras (2002)).
The Dilemma is not unique to those transition countries during that particular period.
The commodity price booms in emerging market commodity exporters such as Brazil, Chile,
and Colombia during the mid-2000s caused domestic economic booms accompanied by huge
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capital inflows and real appreciation, which causes the same monetary policy dilemma. Blan-
chard, Ostry, Ghosh, and Chamon (2016) describe the Dilemma as the general phenomenon
of the emerging economies as follows:
“Emerging market policymakers ... see capital inflows as leading to credit booms and an
increase in output, [the boom] can only be offset by an increase in the policy rate. They
point to a policy Dilemma: while the direct effect of an increase in the policy rate is limit the
increase in output, the indirect effect is to encourage even more capital inflows, potentially
dominating the direct effect.”
The Dilemma cannot be captured in a closed-economy, New Keynesian (NK hereafter)
framework of monetary policy (for example, in Woodford (2003)) in which the capital account
is closed, while workhorse open economy NK models (see, for example, Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2001) and Gali and Monacelli (2005)) also provide few insights into the Dilemma.
These open economy versions of the NK model usually restrict attention to the special case
in which the equilibrium exchange rate and the current account reflect efficient allocation
outcomes across countries. As long as the international resource allocation is efficient, there
is no conceptual difference between closed and open economies in the optimal monetary
policy regime that achieves domestic price stability.
In this paper, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism of an open economy to study how monetary policy is shaped by the
Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma. The model is a decentralized, small open economy in which nominal
and financial frictions coexist. Income in the economy come from endowments of tradable
goods and the production of nontradable goods and collateral. Staggered price adjustment
of nontradable good producers generates the nominal friction, while the financial friction
is due to the collateralized borrowing of households, which uses physical capital needed for
nontradable goods production. Nontradable capital decouples in valuation the capital from
the price of goods traded, which creates a wealth effect through the interplay of the real
exchange rate and the collateral constraint. Since capital is costly to adjust, the price of
2
capital co-moves with investment demand.
In a stationary equilibrium around the steady state in which the collateral constraint
is binding, an exogenous increase in the tradable endowment, which can be thought as a
positive terms of trade and/or commodity price shock, generates a real appreciation, namely
an increase in the relative price of nontradable goods to tradable goods, which raises the
value of collateral and in this way encourages additional capital inflows by relaxing the col-
lateral constraint. Capital inflows expand demand for the tradable good which transmits
to an expansion of demand for the nontradable good. The expansion of aggregate demand
increases the price of capital, which encourages additional capital inflows by relaxing the
collateral constraint further. This self-reinforcing process leads to excessive aggregate exter-
nal indebtedness, which happens because households’ borrowing decisions are decentralized
and they fail to internalize the collective effect of their borrowing decisions on the aggregate
external debt of the economy. Since the economy eventually comes back to the steady state
without the relaxation of the constraint in the long-run, the excessive external debt leads to
consumption volatility that deteriorates welfare. In addition, the expansion of demand for
nontradable goods leads to inflationary pressure in the nontradable sector. This dis-equalizes
households’ marginal rate of substitution between consumption and worked hours and the
marginal rate of transformation by the price rigidity, generating another deterioration in
welfare.
The two inefficiencies in the model economy give rise to the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma. With
respect to the positive tradable endowment shock, monetary tightening against inflationary
pressure in the nontradable sector is not supported as the optimal policy since it causes
further real appreciation which encourages additional capital inflows. Instead, the Ramsey
optimal monetary policy is to ease the domestic interest rate to smooth external debt by
creating a real depreciation. The monetary easing takes on inflation in the nontradable
sector, which implies that the Dilemma shapes optimal monetary policy towards financial
rather than price stability.
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In an extension of the model, I investigate how optimal monetary policy changes if the
external debt is denominated in a local currency or capital flows can be controlled by another
policy instrument, namely a capital control tax. In both cases, the model predicts that the
optimal interest rate policy returns to a counter-cyclical regime focused on price stability. My
findings from the extension with the capital control tax are supportive of recent studies on
monetary and financial policy coordination (see, for example, Klein and Shambaugh (2015),
Aoki, Beningno, and Kiyotaki (2016), and Davis and Presno (2017)).
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to investigate the Tos˘ovsky´
Dilemma by developing an intertemporal general equilibrium framework of the monetary
transmission mechanism. Although the Dilemma has been known for almost two decades
(see, for example, Laurens and Cardoso (1998), Lipschitz et al. (2002), Brunnermeier et al.
(2008), De Gregorio (2010), and Blanchard et al. (2016)), a rigorous model for economic
analysis has not been developed. First, the conventional open economy model broadly relies
on an intertemporal approach of current account in which international resource allocation is
efficient or near-efficient. Second, state-of-the-art literature on the Dilemma has focused on
speculative capital flows stemming from the risk-taking behavior of foreign investors, such as
the profitable carry trade, real exchange rate bubbles, and market sentiments. Although this
channel appears to have empirical relevance, developing an intertemporal general equilibrium
framework that incorporates this channel is difficult as it embeds behavioral elements that
violate assumptions of rational expectations and no-arbitrage. Third, state-of-the-art NK
models for monetary policy analysis mainly constrain the monetary policy reaction function
to satisfy the Taylor principle, which inherently embeds an aggressive, anti-inflation regime
into monetary policy.
The model in this paper seeks to maintain the simplest framework by taking a stylized
approach to a rational expectations equilibrium. The modeling strategy for describing the
Dilemma appeals to real, financial, and nominal frictions that are stylized and commonly
used in the macro and monetary literature. For analysis of the optimal monetary policy, this
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paper does not assume a specific form for the interest rate reaction function and retrieves
the policy function as the solution of the Ramsey problem.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 relates the contribution of the
paper to the previous literature. Section 1.3 develops the model of the monetary transmission
mechanism in a small open economy. Section 1.4 analyzes the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma in the
model. Section 1.5 discusses the Ramsey optimal interest rate policy. Section 1.6 examines
an extension of the model with local currency denominated external debt. Section 1.7 extends
the model by allowing for a tax on the capital flows. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to five branches of literature.
Optimal monetary policy. This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium framework
of the monetary transmission mechanism for optimal monetary policy analysis, which is the
fundamental agenda of the monetary model developed in Woodford (2003) and the subse-
quent New Keynesian literature. Unlike the standard NK models which typically assume a
closed economy, this paper explores the optimal monetary policy in the small open economy
context with an open capital account in the spirit of Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962).
The model investigates the imperfections in international capital markets and concludes that
optimal monetary policy yields a non-trivial deviation from the traditional regime of price
stability. This result yields different policy implications from workhorse open economy mod-
els such as Clarida et al. (2001) and Gali and Monacelli (2005).
Breakdown of divine coincidence in open economies. The model described in this
paper considers the case in which the divine coincidence in open economies, i.e, that capital
account openness does not yield different monetary policy trade-offs from the closed economy
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context, breaks down due to the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma. A strand of literature that describes
the breakdown of the divine coincidence suggests a channel of currency misalignment caused
by local currency pricing or pricing-to-market (for example, Corsetti et al. (2011), Burstein
and Gopinath (2014), and Casas et al. (2017)). Unlike this literature, this paper investigates
a breakdown of the divine coincidence due to a financial wedge in international financial
markets.
This financial wedge is related to the idea of balance sheet effects of exchange rates mo-
tivated by empirical findings in Hausmann et al. (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
Unlike the early literature of modeling the balance sheet effect (see, for example, Cespedes
et al. (2004) and Cook (2004)) which assumes heterogeneous households and focuses on
the financial accelerator channel in the spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999), the baseline model
of this paper keeps identical households and utilizes the Fisherian amplification channel of
asset prices. The balance sheet effect of the exchange rate in this paper comes from the
non-tradability of collateral which yields a wealth effect via the real exchange rate that is
absent in the literature. The model shows strong balance sheet effects via the exchange rate
and predicts optimal monetary policy towards stabilizing balance sheets, without concerns
about the distributional effects of monetary policy.
The monetary policy dilemma in emerging economies. This paper formalizes the no-
tion of the monetary policy dilemma due to cross-border capital flows in emerging economies,
a widely discussed topic by policymakers. The existing literature documents the dilemma
(see, for example, Laurens and Cardoso (1998), Lipschitz et al. (2002), and Blanchard et al.
(2016)), but give loose arguments without a rigorous model - this paper contributes by pro-
viding a theoretical framework of the dilemma. One candidate channel of the monetary
policy dilemma is the risk-taking behavior of international investors (see, for example, Brun-
nermeier et al. (2008), De Gregorio (2010)). The model in this paper instead formalizes the
channel of the dilemma through the lens of inefficient behavior of domestic borrowers. The
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strategy allows the model to be easily extended to an intertemporal setting for dynamic anal-
ysis while generating similar equilibrium phenomena in line with the investors’ risk-taking
behavior channel.
Fisherian amplification of asset prices. This paper uses the Fisherian channel of asset
price amplification (Fisher (1933)) to formalize the financial friction. The recent literature
that develops the idea for business cycle analysis for emerging economies (see, for example,
Auernheimer and Carc´ıa-Saltos (2000), Mendoza (2010), and Korinek (2011)) assumes a real
economy without a monetary transmission mechanism. In contrast, the Fisherian channel
of asset prices in this paper interplays with monetary policy. The paper thus provides richer
insight into the financial leverage of an economy interconnected with domestic monetary
policy, which is absent in the literature.
Monetary policy and financial stability. This paper enters the lively debates on the
role of monetary policy in achieving financial stability. One side (for example, see Stein
(2012) and Adrian and Liang (2016)) supports the role of monetary policy leaning against
the wind in achieving financial stability by controlling risk-taking behavior in the financial
sector. The other side (see, for example, Svensson (2016)) argues that monetary policy and
financial stability policies are different. It claims that although there can be room for coor-
dination between the two policies, financial stability should be achieved by macroprudential
policy, while monetary policy should focus on its original goal of price stability. The litera-
ture, however, is mainly based on the closed economy. This paper claims that the discussion
from the emerging economy perspective is quite different because of the existence of cross-
border capital flows. This paper supports the role of monetary policy for financial stability,
but it is not necessarily leaning against the wind policy. The optimal monetary policy by
the Dilemma becomes pro-cyclical to stabilize the asset price in international prices. This
open economy specific result gives richer insight into this lively topic.
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Capital controls. An extension of the model considers a capital control tax as another
Ramsey policy instrument. The extension relates to the recently growing literature on capi-
tal control taxes for business cycle stabilization (see, for example, Bianchi (2011), Farhi and
Werning (2012), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)). Unlike the literature, which typically
assumes a real model, this paper includes a capital control tax in a nominal model to inves-
tigate the interplay with monetary policy, in line with the recent NK literature on monetary
and financial policy coordination (for example, see Aoki et al. (2016) and Davis and Presno
(2017)). This paper formally solves the Ramsey optimal coordination of the two instruments
and supports the finding that coordination enhances the role of monetary policy for price
stability.
1.3 The Model
In this section, I develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of optimal interest rate pol-
icy, under circumstances in which an economy faces the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma. The framework
is dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the monetary transmission mechanism
in a small open economy. The economy has multiple sectors, one for tradable and another
for nontradable goods. The tradable sector is assumed to follow a stochastic endowment
process, while the nontradable sector has a production structure subject to staggered price
adjustment by monopolistically competitive firms. Households’ financing decisions are de-
centralized, and the financing must be collateralized. I focus on the equilibrium in which
the borrowing constraint is always binding, which yields a welfare cost due to a pecuniary
externality. I begin by describing the households’ problem.
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1.3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households on the real interval [0, 1].
A household’s preferences are a function of its consumption and labor supply, which are




βtU (ct, ht) ,
where U(·, ·) is a periodic utility function that is strictly positive in its first argument, strictly
negative in its second argument, and strictly concave. Variable ct is the final consumption
basket in real terms, and ht is the number of worked hours supplied by the household.
The final consumption basket is a composite of tradable consumption cτt and nontradable
consumption cnt . The aggregation technology is assumed to be





where A(·, ·) is a CES-Armington (see Armington (1969)) aggregator that satisfies A1(·, ·) >
0, A2(·, ·) > 0, A11(·, ·) < 0, A22(·, ·) < 0, and A12(·, ·) = A21(·, ·) > 0, where a subscript with
a number j ∈ {1, 2} denotes the partial derivative with respect to the jth argument.
Each household trades domestic and international assets. Ddt is the position of domestic
debt denominated in domestic currency, assumed at time t and due at t + 1 and dt is the
position of international debt denominated in foreign currency and follows the same maturity
structure as domestic debt. Variables it and r
∗
t refer to the nominal rates of interest for the
domestic and international assets in each currency unit, respectively. I assume that the rest
of the world has zero inflation so that the nominal international financial variables, dt and
r∗t , are real variables in foreign currency units. Et denotes the nominal exchange rate that
determines the units of domestic currency needed to purchase one unit of foreign currency.
It is assumed that the household owns physical capital kt. The evolution of physical
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capital has the following law of motion with costly investment,
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + S(ivt, ivt−1), (1.1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the actualized depreciation rate of physical capital, ivt is investment
in physical capital, and S(ivt, ivt−1) is investment net of adjustment costs. The household
also owns firms such that firms’ profits are rebated to the household in every period. The







t + Ptivt + (1 + it−1)D
d
t−1 + Et(1 + r∗t−1(dt−1))dt−1
= P τt y
τ
t + (1− τ pt ) (Wtht +Rkt kt) +Ddt + Etdt + Ψt + Tt,
where P τt and P
n
t are the nominal prices of tradable good and nontradable good, respectively.
Pt is the consumer price index (CPI), R
k
t is the nominal rate of return of physical capital,
and Wt is the nominal wage rate for hours worked by the household. It is assumed that the
factor income Wtht + R
k
t kt can be taxed by the government at rate τ
p
t . Variable Ψt refers
to the nominal profit of firms rebated to the household, and Tt refers to a nominal lump
sum transfer by the government. The interest rate of foreign debt r∗t ≡ r∗t (dt) is an explicit
function of the foreign debt position of each household. This form of internal debt elastic
interest rate (IDEIR) induces stationarity in the external debt position (see Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2003)).
The nominal variables have unit roots. To stationarize them, I divide the budget con-







t + ivt +
1 + it−1
1 + pit





t + (1− τ pt ) (wtht + rkt kt) + ddt + etdt + ψt + tt, (1.2)
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is the price of the
nontradable good relative to CPI, 1 + pit =
Pt
Pt−1
is the gross CPI inflation rate, and et =
Et
Pt









is the real position of home debt, ψt ≡ ΨPt is real profit, and tt ≡ TtPt is the real government
transfer.
When the household makes its financing decision, the amount borrowed is constrained
to be at most a fraction κ > 0 of the price of physical capital. The collateral constraint is
given by
Etdt +Ddt ≤ κQtkt+1,




t ≤ κqtkt+1, (1.3)
where qt ≡ QtPt is the Tobin’s q. The collateral constraint comes from an incentive problem
between lenders and households. The parameter κ is interpreted as the fraction of the
collateral that the lenders can liquidate when the households are delinquent on their debt
obligation. Therefore the collateral constraint reflects an incentive compatibility constraint
for the households which prevents delinquency on their debt obligation in equilibrium (see
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). The households’ borrowing decisions are decentralized and
thus each household fails to internalize the effect of its financial decisions on the aggregate
indebtedness of the economy.
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t + (1− τ pt )(wtht + rkt kt) + ddt + etdt + ψt + tt









+λtqt ((1− δ)kt + S (ivt, ivt−1)− kt+1) + λtΘt
(
κqtkt+1 − etdt − ddt
)}
,
where βtλt and β
tλtqt, β
tλtΘt are Lagrange multipliers associated with the sequential budget
constraint (1.2), law of motion of capital accumulation (1.1), and the household’s collateral
constraint (1.3), respectively. At each time t, each household takes {ddt−1, dt−1, kt, yτt } and
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pτt
, (1.6)












(1− δ)qt+1 + (1− τ pt+1)rkt+1
)]
, (1.8)


























where Sj(·, ·), j = 1, 2 is the partial derivative of the function with respect to its first and
second argument, respectively. In addition, the equilibrium should satisfy no-satiation con-
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With a restriction on the stationarity of capital, limj→∞ Etkt+1+j <∞, and a restriction on









































where χτ ∈ (0, 1) is the share parameter of the consumption of tradable good and η > 0
governs the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradable consumption and non-
tradable consumption. The optimal composition of tradable and nontradable consumption





t )− P τt cτt − P nt cnt ,






1−η + (1− χτ ) (P nt )1−η
) 1
1−η ,








1−η + (1− χτ ) (pnt )1−η
) 1
1−η . (1.11)
Similarly to the final consumption basket, it is assumed that the final investment basket
ivt is composed of an aggregation of tradable and nontradable components. The aggregator




t ) . Given the
prices and final investment basket ivt, the household calculates the optimal composition of
ivτt and iv
n
t which maximize the profit from the aggregation
A(ivτt , iv
n
t )− pτt ivτt − pnt ivnt ,
and the optimal decomposition for ivτt and iv
n























There are tradable and nontradable sectors in the economy. The tradable sector is assumed
to follow a stochastic endowment process, while the nontradable sector has a monopolistically
competitive production with producers’ pricing decisions subject to some degree of staggered
adjustment.
Tradable Endowment





= ρτ ln (y
τ




where ρτ is the persistence of the process and 
τ
t is the orthogonal innovation of the process,
which has mean zero and standard deviation στ . The stochastic nature of the tradable
endowment aims to describe foreign demand and supply shocks such as terms of trade and
commodity price shocks which are considered to be external sources of business cycles in
emerging economies. It can also be interpreted as productivity shocks in the tradable sector
which create the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Nontradable Production
In the nontradable sector, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms on
the real unit interval, [0, 1]. Each firm j ∈ [0, 1] produces an intermediate good ynjt which
is an ingredient in the final nontradable good ynt . The nontradable good is the standard











where µ is the constant elasticity of intratemporal substitution between the intermediaries
reflective of a firm’s market power. Here µ > 1 is assumed to ensure positive marginal
revenue for each firm. The optimal price index of nontradable good P nt is the result of









where P njt is the nominal price of each intermediary j. The necessary first order conditions




























jtdj. Each firm j has the production function with fixed cost
F(kjt, hjt)− ϕ,
where F(·, ·) is a function that is homogeneous with degree one, and is strictly concave in
its first and second arguments. Parameter ϕ > 0 is a constant fixed cost of production that
prevents positive profits in the nonstochastic steady state. The production function F(·, ·)
and the fixed cost parameter ϕ are assumed to be same across firms.
Since households own the firms, the firms share the stochastic discount factor of the

















where hjt and kjt are the inputs of labor and physical capital for the production of firm j,
respectively. It is assumed that there is no under-production in each intermediary, which
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means
F (kjt, hjt)− ϕ ≥ ynjt. (1.16)
The factor market is perfectly competitive and factor prices are fully flexible. Each firm j









jt+s −Wt+shjt+s −Rkt+skjt+s +MCjt+s
(F (kjt+s, hjt+s)− ϕ− ynjt+s)) ,
and the first order conditions yield the following time invariant conditional factor demand
functions,
MCjtF1(kjt, hjt) = Rkt ,
MCjtF2(kjt, hjt) = Wt,
where the shadow price MCjt is the nominal marginal cost of the firm j. The marginal cost
is identical across firms for all the time, MCjt = MCt, ∀j, t, because firms have the same
functional form F(·, ·) which is homogeneous with degree one, and factor costs Rkt and Wt
are same across the firms, resulting in the same capital-labor ratio across firms. Dividing
the above two equations by Pt gives their real forms,
mctF1(kt, ht) = rkt , (1.17)
mctF2(kt, ht) = wt, (1.18)
where mct ≡ MCtPt is the real marginal cost in terms of the CPI.
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Supply
Firms in the nontradable sector are price setters because they have some degree of market
power in the goods market. To generate an intertemporal Keynesian aggregate supply in
the nontradable sector, I borrow the framework of staggered adjustment of nominal prices
in the spirit of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996).
In each period, a 1 − θ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of firms can reset their prices P˜ njt, whereas the
remaining fraction θ of firms are forced to keep their previous prices. I also assume that in
each period, the firms who can reset their prices are independently and identically drawn
among the continuum of the real interval, so that the draw is time and state independent.
At each time t, a firm j who is able to set its product price sets P˜ njt to maximize its expected
profit, assuming it would not be able to reset the price again in the future. Then the firm









jt+s −Wt+shjt+s −Rkt+skjt+s +MCt+s
(F (kjt+s, hjt+s)− ϕ− ynjt+s)) .
The necessary first order condition with respect to P˜ njt, with replacing the {yjt} of the










(1− µ)P˜ njt + µMCt+s
)
= 0,
which implies that the firm’s pricing seeks to equalize the present value of marginal revenue
with the present value of marginal cost in the case where the firm can never reset its price
again in the future. The optimality condition’s equivalence between the two present values
collapses to the equivalence between the static marginal revenue and cost when nominal
prices are fully flexible, i.e., θ = 0. Thus the draw of the fraction θ is time and state

























































where θ is the set of firms who cannot reset the current price and θc is the complementary
set. Dividing both sides of the above equation by P nt gives
1 = θ(1 + pint )
µ−1 + (1− θ) (p¯nt )1−µ , (1.20)








, which are the rate of inflation in the nontradable
sector and desired nominal price of a 1 − θ fraction of producers relative to the price level
in the nontradable sector, respectively.














































refers to desired price of the firms in real terms, zt and ft describe the





relative terms of the desired prices p¯nt and p˜
n






















































sum transfers Tt to households. I assume that the fiscal authority commits to a Ricardian
regime of fiscal policy such that at the end of each period, the lump-sum transfer Tt to each




















1.3.4 Foreign Interest Rate
The interest rate on the external debt of the economy r∗t is exogenously set by foreign lenders
from the rest of the world. As described in section 1.3.1, the interest rate function has an
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internal debt elastic interest rate (IDEIR) form, specifically assumed to be






t−1 − 1, (1.25)






= ρr log (
r
t ) + ν
r
t+1, (1.26)
where ρr ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence of the process and νrt is the orthogonal innovation with
mean zero and standard deviation σr. The shock can be interpreted as a country premium
shock or monetary policy shock from the rest of the world.
1.3.5 Equilibrium
I assume that the price of the tradable good and nominal exchange rate perfectly coincide
such that law of one price (LOP) holds for tradable goods, which implies P τt = Et. The real
form of the LOP divided by Pt is
pτt = et. (1.27)








































































= θxt−1(1 + pint )
µ + (1− θ)(p¯n)−µ. (1.29)


























ht = F(kt, ht).
And since ynjt = F(kjt, hjt)− ϕ, integrating both sides across firms yields
ynt = x
−1
t (F(kt, ht)− ϕ) . (1.30)
Market clearing in the nontradable sector equates production of the nontradable good and






Domestic debt is cleared domestically, ddt ≡
∫ 1
0
ddt (i)di = 0. The economy-wide resource
constraint in equilibrium then becomes
cτt + iv
τ




t + dt. (1.32)
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Finally, the collateral constraint of the economy collapses to etdt ≤ κqtkt+1. I restrict my
attention to the equilibrium around the deterministic steady state in where the collateral
constraint is always binding. This gives
etdt = κqtkt+1. (1.33)
I define the competitive equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1.3.1 (Competitive Equilibrium) The competitive equilibrium of the econ-





t }∞t=0 that satisfy equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.4)-(1.13), (1.17)-(1.18), (1.20)-(1.25),(1.27)-
(1.33), given the policy processes it and τ
p





satisfy equations (1.14) and (1.26).
1.4 The Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma
As shown in equation (1.33), I restrict my attention the case where Θt > 0, which implies
that the collateral constraint is binding in equilibrium. For consistency of the assumption
in the steady state, it is required that the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral
constraint, Θ, should be positive in the steady state.
Assumption 1.4.1 Θ > 0.
This yields impatience for the households, which gives a discount factor smaller than the one
under a risk-free market rate.
Lemma 1.4.1 Given Θ and r¯∗, β = 1−Θ
1+r∗ , where r






Proof. See Appendix A.3.1.
The assumption and lemma describe imperfection and underdevelopment in the financial
market which typically prevail in emerging economies.
1.4.1 Inefficiencies
When there is an external shock that relaxes the households’ budget constraint, such as an
increase in yτt or decrease in r
∗
t , the economy faces distortions. The inefficiency from the
distortions encourage the social planner to intervene in the competitive equilibrium.
(1) External Indebtedness. Because of the collateral constraint, the households do not
engage in consumption smoothing as in the standard intertemporal approach of the current
account. The households’ desire to borrow always exceeds the borrowing limit, κqtkt+1.
When the shock relaxes the households’ budget constraint, each household increases demand









The investment in physical capital causes an additional effect. The increase in physical
capital stock kt+1 from the investment relaxes the collateral constraint,
etdt = κqtkt+1.
Thus, the households’ investment in physical capital is determined by a combination of
the standard investment channel and a collateral channel. Recall that the intertemporal
















(1− δ)qt+1 + rkt+1
)]
+ κΘtqt.
Equation (1.7) describes the standard theory of costly investment. Equation (1.8), on the
other hand, describes the optimality condition that equates an increase in the marginal util-
ity of wealth from an additional unit of capital and an increase in the future marginal utility
from the resale price of capital and capital gains, plus an increase in the marginal utility of
wealth from relaxing the collateral constraint. It creates a Fisherian feedback loop to the
price of capital, qt. Since all households are identical, they all want to invest in physical
capital, and since capital is costly to adjust, there is an increase in the price of capital qt. An
increase in qt directly increases the collateral value qtkt+1 and thereby yields further relax-
ation of the collateral constraint Θt. It affects the capital cost and triggers a self-reinforcing
spiral on the price of capital until the capital market clears. The economic environment in
which the households’ decision is decentralized and the binding collateral constraint yields
excessive and inefficient dynamics in aggregate external indebtedness.
(2) Inflation in the Non-Tradable Sector. The increases in consumption and investment
and complementarity between tradables and nontradables causes an increase in nontradable
demand. Under the nominal price rigidity in the nontradable sector, the increase in demand
generates inflationary pressure in the nontradable sector pint , which yields an efficiency loss
in nontradable production via equation (1.29),
xt = θxt−1(1 + pint )
µ + (1− θ)(p¯nt )−µ,
which is also the mirror image of the dis-equalization of households’ MRS between consump-
tion and labor supply and the MRT caused by the price rigidity, which violates optimality
25
condition between consumption and production of the economy.
1.4.2 The Dilemma
If the nominal interest rate it is the only instrument available to the social planner, this
environment creates a policy dilemma. An increase of it that aims to suppress inflation in



























where rr∗t ≡ (1+r∗t ) is the gross foreign real interest rate. The equation (1.34) shows that the







> 0. Conditional on fixing other variables, the real
appreciation relaxes the collateral constraint since it decreases the unit cost of borrowing in















where superscript 1 denotes the case with monetary policy intervention and superscript 0
denotes the case without intervention. When (1.35) materializes, there are further capital
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inflows from the monetary tightening which contradicts the policy objective of preventing
excessive external indebtedness. On the other hand, if the monetary authority conducts
loosene monetary policy to prevent (1.35), it contradicts the policy objective of suppressing
inflation in the nontradable sector. I define the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma as follows.
Definition 4.1 (The Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma) Given a positive external shock, the set of
monetary reactions {Rt} ⊂ R that causes rr1t > rr0t and qτ1t k1t+1 > qτ0t k0t+1 is the policy set
of the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma.
The Dilemma comes from two properties of the collateral constraint: i) the collateral (phys-
ical capital) is nontradable, and ii) investment in physical capital is costly. To make the
point clear, let us consider the case in which physical capital is tradable and investment is
not costly. Then the collateral constraint collapses to
dt = κkt+1.
In such a case, any policy {Rt} ⊂ R which yields rr1t > rr0t does not bring k1t+1 > k0t+1,
since Tobin’s q is 1 and the increase in the real interest rate increases the cost of capital,
suppressing investment. In other words, the Dilemma never materializes. If collateral is
nontradable but investment is costly, the intertemporal relation of investment becomes





which implies that the pricing of capital in tradable goods q¯t already reflects the expected
movement of real exchange rate which is highlighted in term (*). In this case, there is
no effect to the collateral constraint from the real appreciation, and the Dilemma does not
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materialize. The case in which the collateral is tradable and costless investment is ambiguous.
In such a case, the collateral constraint collapses to
etdt = κkt+1,
and there is no Fisherian spiral in price of capital since the Tobin’s q is always one. However,
the real appreciation continues to create a collateral effect. Another case for the for currency
denomination of external debt to the wealth effect on the collateral constraint is analyzed in
section 1.6.
Note that the Dilemma is a particular case of the trade-offs between price stability and
financial stability, which is largely discussed in cuent literature (for example, see Curdia and
Woodford (2016), Aoki et al. (2016), Davis and Presno (2017)). The Dilemma in this model
describes a policy paradox in which a policy that corrects one distortion exacerbates another.
How does the Dilemma shape optimal monetary policy? I discuss it in the next section by
solving the Ramsey problem.
1.5 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, I derive the Ramsey optimal monetary policy. The Ramsey planner seeks
to maximize his lifetime utility, taking the competitive equilibrium conditions of the decen-
tralized economy as constraints. It is also assumed that the Ramsey planner has a device
to commit to policy promises made previously. In particular, I assume that commitment
is optimal from a timeless perspective (see Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and Woodford
(2003)), to achieve time-invariant optimality conditions in the Ramsey equilibrium.
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1.5.1 The Ramsey Equilibrium






where xt is a vector of predetermined endogenous variables at time t,




























The vector γt is a policy vector determined by the Ramsey planner, and st is an exogenous
stochastic process vector which follows the stationary Markov process
st+1 − s¯ = Φs (st − s¯) + νst+1,
where s¯ is a vector for steady state values of the process, Φs is a vector of coefficients, and


























where 0 is a zero vector.
The Lagrangian of the Ramsey planner with a commitment device optimal from a timeless
















where βR is the subjective discount factor of the Ramsey planner and β
t
RΛt is a Lagrange
multiplier of the Ramsey problem associated with the competitive equilibrium conditions P.
I define the Ramsey equilibrium as follows.
Definition 5.1 (The Ramsey Equilibrium) Let ut ≡ (xt+1,yt,γt)′. The Ramsey equi-




subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (1.36). I assume that the utility function
and the discount factor of the Ramsey planner are the same as the households UR = U, βR =
β, following the convention that assumes that the Ramsey planner is the representative
household of the economy. In computing the Ramsey optimal monetary policy, I set the
time invariant tax rate on the production τ p = − 1
µ−1 , so that it eliminates the distortion
from the monopolistic competition and isolates the distortion from the price stickiness. Since
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µ > 1, the tax rate becomes the production subsidy.
1.5.2 Calibration
In section 1.3.1, the CES-Armington aggregator is assumed to be given by


















I assume that the periodic utility function of the households is given by Greenwood-Hercowitz-
Huffman (GHH) preferences









The functional form of costly investment is taken from Christiano et al. (2005), as given by










where φ governs the elasticity of the adjustment cost with respect to investment. The
production function of the nontradable good is assumed to be the Cobb-Douglas function
F (kt, ht) = kαt h1−αt ,
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter that governs the capital share of nontradable good pro-
duction.
Table 1.1 shows the benchmark calibration of the structural parameters. I set the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ to be 2 and labor supply elasticity ω to be
1.445, taking standard values in the business cycle literature. The frequency of the model is
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quarterly. The parameter for the world interest rate r¯∗ is set to 1.041/4 − 1, which implies
that the quarterly risk free world interest rate is 1 percent. The parameter for IDEIR, d¯, is
set to 4.0495, which gives a 1 percent steady state trade balance to output ratio in the steady
state where the economy has an external debt elastic interest rate function (EDEIR). The
elasticity of the foreign interest rate with respect to the debt position, ψ, is set to 0.0000335,
following the calibrated value in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017). With these parameters,
the steady state level of foreign interest rate becomes





The steady state impatience parameter Θ is set to 0.014, which sets the households’ discount
factor β ≡ 1−Θ
1+r¯∗+ψed−d¯d at 0.9764. The β targets β
−4−1 = 0.10, which is the average of annual
country interest rates across emerging economies estimated in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´
(2017). The elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and nontradable goods is set
to be 0.5, in line with estimates in Akinci (2011). I set the bias toward the tradable goods
parameter, χτ , to 0.3, capital share in nontradable goods production α to 0.25, and elasticity
of substitution across nontradable intermediaries µ to 6, all of which are consistent with the
related literature. The fixed cost parameter in nontradable production τ is calibrated to
0.4859 to ensure zero profit in the steady state. The steady-state tradable endowment is
normalized to 1. The collateral constraint parameter κ is set to be 0.1936 to match the
external debt position implied in the IDEIR interest rate function.
The parameter that governs the elasticity of costly capital adjustment φ does not affect
steady state solutions but does affect the endogenous propagation mechanism. I set φ = 0.1
in this section, which is an arbitrary and small number compared to the related literature.
This point will be discussed in section 1.5.5. The parameters for the exogenous processes
of tradable endowment ρy and σ
y
 are taken from estimates in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´
(2017), who use Argentine data over the 1983 Q1 - 2001 Q3 period. The parameters for
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the exogenous processes of the world real interest rate ρr and σr are estimated by fitting an
AR(1) model to quarterly U.S. real interest rates from 1948 Q2 - 2013 Q3. The data is taken
from the updated dataset in Uribe and Yue (2006).
In the following subsections, I investigate the properties of optimal monetary policy in the
long-run (non-stochastic steady state) and in the short-run (cyclical fluctuation around the
steady state). I examine two models, a baseline model with the collateral constraint (labeled
as ‘Tos˘ovsky´’) and a model without the collateral constraint (labeled as ’Standard’). The
calibrated parameters in the Standard model are described in Table A.1 in Appendix A4.
33
Table 1.1: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ω 1.455 Labor supply elasticity parameter
r¯∗ 1.041/4 − 1 Risk free world interest rate
d¯ 4.0495 IDEIR parameter
ψ 0.0000335 Elasticity of r∗t with respect to debt adjustment
Θ 0.014 Impatience parameter of borrowers
β 0.9764 Subjective discount factor
η 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between T and NT goods
χτ 0.3 Preference bias toward the tradable good
α 0.25 Capital share of nontradable good production
θ 0.7 Calvo-Yun parameter
µ 6 Elasticity of substitution across NT intermediaries
τ p -0.2 Production Tax Rate (Subsidy)
τ 0.4859 Fixed cost of production in NT sector
y¯τ 1 Tradable endowment in the steady state
κ 0.1936 Collateral constraint parameter
φ 0.1 Elasticity of costly capital adjustment
ρy 0.79 Persistence of the log endowment shock
ρr 0.87 Persistence of the log foreign interest rate shock
σy 0.0351 Standard deviation of the log endowment shock
σr 0.0026 Standard deviation of the log foreign interest rate shock
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1.5.3 Optimality of Price Stability in the Long-Run
To investigate the long-run properties of the Ramsey equilibrium, I characterize the Ramsey
equilibrium in the non-stochastic steady state. One question of interest is the optimal rate
of inflation in the steady state. This is not a trivial question, particularly in the Tos˘ovsky´
model because there are two frictions: staggered adjustment of nontradable prices and the
collateral constraint. The following proposition shows that the economy yields a zero opti-
mal inflation rate in the steady state, which means that monetary policy engaging in price
stability is the optimal monetary policy in the long-run regardless of the existence of the
collateral constraint.
Proposition 1.5.1 There is zero inflation in the Ramsey optimal steady state.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.2.
Table 1.2 below shows several key economic indicators in the Ramsey optimal steady state
under benchmark calibration.
Table 1.2: The Ramsey Optimal Steady State










Tos˘ovsky´ 0 4.0 1.08 0.88 0.11 4.49 0.89 0.11
Standard 0 4.0 1.24 0.85 0.14 5.84 0.86 0.14
Notes. ‘Tos˘ovsky´’ model refers to the model with the collateral constraint. ‘Standard’ model refers
to the model without the collateral constraint. Variable pin refers to the annualized net inflation rate
in the nontradable sector (in percent) and variable i refers to the annualized net nominal interest
rate (in percent). Variable e refers to real exchange rate as the nominal exchange rate divided by the








yn refer to the consumption-output ratio, investment-output ratio,
capital-output ratio, consumption-output ratio in the nontradable sector, and investment-output
ratio in the nontradable sector, respectively.
In the Tos˘ovsky´ model, the annual inflation rate in the nontradable sector is zero and the
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nominal interest rate is the same as the world interest rate, which is 4 percent in annual
terms. The steady state real exchange rate, defined as the nominal exchange rate divided
by the CPI, e ≡ E
P
, is 1.08. The percentage of aggregate consumption in GDP, c
y
× 100, is
88, the percentage of aggregate investment in GDP, iv
y
× 100, is 11, and the capital-output
ratio, k
y
, is 4.49. In the nontradable sector, the percentage of nontradable consumption in
gross nontradable output, c
n
yn
× 100, is 89, and the percentage of nontradable investment in
gross nontradable ouput, iv
n
yn
× 100, is 11.
The standard model without the collateral constraint also yields a zero inflation rate and
a nominal domestic interest rate that is the same as in the Tos˘ovsky´ model.
1.5.4 Breakdown of Price Stability in the Short-Run in the Tos˘ovsky´
Model
To compute policy functions of economic indicators, I approximate the equilibrium system
up to first and second orders around the Ramsey steady state using perturbation methods
(see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004)). Table 1.3 shows the unconditional sec-
ond moments of interest rates and price indicators under the benchmark calibration. The
table shows that the standard deviation of the annual inflation rate in the nontradable sector
is 4.42 percentage points, a nontrivial deviation from the standard monetary policy regime
of price stability.
Result 1.1 (Breakdown of the Regime of Price Stability) The standard deviation of
inflation in the nontradable sector in the baseline model is nonzero and quantitatively high.
On the other hand, in the standard model without the constraint, the standard deviation
of nontradable inflation is 0 percentage points. The subsequent proposition follows.
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Table 1.3: Unconditional Second Moments, Tos˘ovsky´ and Standard Models




σ (it) ρ (it, y
τ
t )
Tos˘ovsky´ 4.42 4.10 9.52 -0.62
Standard 0 94.62 1.13 0.02
Notes. ‘Tos˘ovsky´’ model refers to the model with the collateral constraint. ‘Standard’ model refers
to the model without the collateral constraint. Symbol σ(x) refers to the standard deviation of
variable x in percentage points. Symbol ρ(x, y) refers to the correlation coefficient between variables
x and y.
Proposition 1.5.2 (From Nominal To Real in the Standard Model) The standard
model with optimal monetary policy can be represented by a current account model only with
real variables.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.3.
Table 1.3 shows more than the breakdown of price stability. The standard deviation of
the policy instrument, the annualized nominal interest rate, is 9.52 percentage points in the
Tos˘ovsky´ model, which is far bigger than the 1.13 percentage points in the standard model
without the collateral constraint. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between the nom-
inal interest rate and tradable endowment is -0.62 in the Tos˘ovsky´ model, which is negative,
whereas the correlation in the standard model is 0.02 which is almost zero. This implies
that the Ramsey planner in the Tos˘ovsky´ model gives up the conventional counter-cyclical
regime of monetary policy towards price stability regime when he faces the policy Dilemma.
Result 1.2 (Ramsey Planner’s Choice to the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma) The Ramsey
optimal interest rate policy in the baseline model is negatively correlated with the tradable
endowment.
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It is important to note that Results 1.1 and 1.2 are contrast with the standard NK
regime of monetary policy. Impulse response functions of the models give clearer insight.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the theoretical impulse response functions of key economic indica-
tors with respect to a 1 percent positive tradable endowment shock from the steady state
level. The responses of the Tos˘ovsky´ model (solid line) and the standard model (dotted line)
are substantially different. With respect to the endowment shock, the Ramsey response of
the nominal interest rate in the Tos˘ovsky´ model is significant easing, whereas the standard
model without the collateral constraint shows modest tightening. The annualized nominal
interest rate in the Tos˘ovsky´ model decreases to 1.56 percentage points. This monetary
easing results in an increase in the inflation rate in the nontradable sector and real depreci-
ation. The annual inflation rate in the Tos˘ovsky´ model increases to 1.1 percent, whereas it
is perfectly stabilized (zero) in the standard model. The real exchange rate, as the nominal
exchange rate divided by the aggregate price index, shows a hump shaped trajectory in the
Tos˘ovsky´ model. It shows a 0.25 percent initial increase from the steady state level, goes
down to a -0.3 percent decrease from the steady state level, and gradually depreciates to its
steady state level.
The dynamics of the net debt position of the Tos˘ovsky´ model and the standard model
go in opposite directions. In the Tos˘ovsky´ model, there is a modest capital inflow. The
inflow of external debt in the Tos˘ovsky´ model is constrained by the monetary easing, which
is reflected in the 14 percent initial increase of the Lagrange multiplier of the collateral
constraint. Facing the Dilemma, the Ramsey planner chooses to stabilize the collateral
constraint, by managing the price of collateral, namely the price of capital in terms of the
tradable good, qτt ≡ qtet . In contrast, in the model without the collateral constraint, the
conventional channel of the intertemporal current account dominates. There are capital
outflows (saving) in the economy and the Ramsey planner happily allows real appreciation.
The dynamics of real appreciation and the net debt position are consequences of efficient
allocation, and there are few concerns of financial instability for the Ramsey planner.
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The impulse response functions with respect to a 1 percent decrease in annual foreign
interest rate give similar insight. In response to the foreign interest rate shock, the Ramsey
planner in the Tos˘ovsky´ model lowers the annual nominal interest rate to 1.5 percent, and the
annual inflation rate in the nontradable sector increases to 0.5 percent. In the standard model
without the collateral constraint, there is monetary tightening after an initial easing, and
the inflation rate is fully stabilized. The heterogeneous responses are related to the Ramsey
planner’s concern over financial stability. The aggressive monetary easing in the Tos˘ovsky´
model yields much milder real appreciation compared to the standard model without financial
frictions. The suppressed real appreciation gives rise to milder dynamics of the price of
collateral and capital inflows in the Tos˘ovsky´ model.
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Increase in Tradable Endowment
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Capital Price in Tradables
















Notes. The solid line refers to the Tos˘ovsky´ model, and the dashed line refers to the standard
model. IRFs of the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate in the nontradable sector (pin) are
represented in annual percent terms. 40
Figure 1.2: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Decrease in Foreign Interest Rate
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Notes. The solid line refers to the Tos˘ovsky´ model, and the dashed line refers to the standard
model. IRFs of the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate in the nontradable sector (pin) are
represented in annual percent terms. 41
1.5.5 Costly Capital Adjustment, the Dilemma, and Ramsey Re-
sponses
As discussed in section 1.5.2, costly adjustment of physical capital crucially contributes to the
Dilemma. The baseline calibration assumes a small range for the adjustment cost, φ = 0.1,
relative to estimates in previous papers. Altig et al. (2005) estimate it to be 2.79 using
quarterly U.S. data over Q2 1959 - Q4 2001, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) estimtate it to be
1.37 using quarterly Mexican data over Q1 1980 - Q1 2003, and Garc´ıa-Cicoo et al. (2010)
estimate it to be 5.6 using annual Argentine data over 1990 to 2005. This section investigates
how the Ramsey response depends on the degree of costly capital adjustment.
Figure 1.3: Costly Capital Adjustment and Deviation from Price Stability



































ivt. The left panel shows the unconditional standard deviation of the annual
inflation rate in the nontradable sector in the Tos˘ovsky´ model. The right panel shows the ratio
between the unconditional standard deviations of annual inflation in the nontradable sector and
log linearized external debt, dˆt.
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Figure 1.4 shows the unconditional standard deviation of inflation in the nontradable
sector, σpin , and the relative volatility between nontradable inflation and the net external
debt position, σpin
σd
, in the Tos˘ovsky´ model. The Ramsey standard deviation of the inflation
rate monotonically increases as φ increases. Furthermore, the relative volatility between
inflation and the net debt position monotonically increases as φ increases. This indicates




, than price stability,
σ (pint ), as capital adjustment becomes more costly.
1.6 Local Currency External Debt
In this section, I extend the model to investigate how the currency denomination of external
debt alters the wealth effect of monetary policy on the collateral constraint. I assume that
the economy borrows from the rest of the world by issuing domestic currency denominated
debt.
To examine this channel, I introduce two heterogeneous households: ‘arbitrageurs’ that
can trade local and foreign currency denominated assets, and ‘borrowers’ who issue inter-
national debt denominated in the local currency. Borrowers are subject to a borrowing
constraint on international debt, whereas arbitrageurs are not. Furthermore the collateral
constraint of borrowers is elastic to the value of domestic collateral in terms of domestic
currency. I utilize heterogeneous households because otherwise the foreign interest rate does
not play a role in the case of local currency denominated debt, deviating from the small open
economy perspective and preventing the model from being closed.
Arbitrageurs
There is a continuum of identical arbitrageurs on the unit interval, [0, 1]. The arbitrageurs
receive a tradable endowment, consume tradable goods, and trade home and international
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where Ua(·) is a utility function which is twice differentiable, strictly positive, and strictly
concave. Variable cτat is the consumption of the tradable good of the arbitrageur in real
terms and βa ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, common to all arbitrageurs. The
sequential resource constraint in domestic currency is
P τt c
τa
t + (1 + it−1)D
d
t−1 + Et(1 + r∗t−1(dat−1))dat−1 = P τt yτat +Ddt + Etdat + T at ,
where variable dat is the arbitrageur’s nominal foreign currency debt position which bears
gross nominal rate of return, 1 + r∗t (d
a
t ), with the same form of IDEIR as in section 4.
Variable yτat = y
τa denotes the arbitrageur’s tradable endowment, which is non-stochastic.
Variable T at denotes the nominal lump sum transfer from the government. Dividing the





















Necessary first order conditions of the Lagrangian of the arbitrageur associated with {cτat , dt, d∗at }
are




















1 + r∗t (d
a














t is the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint. The transversality condi-
tions of the two assets hold with equality.
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Borrowers
In addition to arbitrageurs, there is continuum of identical borrowers on the unit interval,
[0, 1]. The borrowers are similar to the households in section 1.3 except they only trade one
type of asset. The borrowers hold and invest physical capital, kt, used for production in
nontradable sector. Borrowers are more impatient than arbitrageurs, which is represented in
the discount factor βb < βa. The borrowers’ variables are denoted with superscript b, except
investment, ivt, and physical capital, kt, which belong to borrowers only. Each borrower










where U b(·, ·) is a function which is strictly positive in its first argument, strictly negative
in its second argument, and stictly concave. Variable cbt is the final consumption basket in
real terms and ht is hours worked by the borrower. As in the model in section 1.3, the final








which shares the same functional properties as before. Variable cτbt is a consumption of
tradable goods and cnt is consumption of nontradable goods by the borrower. The borrower’s













t + (1− τ pt ) (Wtht +Rkt kt) +Dbt + Ψt + T bt ,
where variable Dbt is the nominal domestic currency denominated international debt position
of the borrower assumed at time t and due at t + 1, yτat denotes the borrower’s tradable
endowment which follows the same stochastic process as in section 1.3, and T bt is the nominal
lump sum transfer to the borrower. The factor income of the borrower Wtht + R
k
t kt can be
taxed by the government at rate τ pt . Variable Ψt refers to the nominal profit of firms rebated
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to the borrower, and T bt refers to a nominal lump sum transfer to the borrower from the














t + (1− τ pt ) (wtht + rkt kt) + dbt + φt + tbt . (1.43)
The evolution of physical capital follows the law of motion in equation (1.1). I assume that
the borrowers’ international debt position should be backed by his stock of physical capital
as collateral. The financial friction of the borrower is represented by the following borrowing
constraint,
Dbt ≤ κQtkt+1,
where κ > 0 is a parameter, and Qt is the nominal price of new physical capital, the Tobin’s
marginal q times CPI. Dividing the collateral constraint by Pt gives
dbt ≤ κqtkt+1, (1.44)
Necessary first order conditions of the Lagrangian problem of the borrower associated with





































(1− τ pt )wt
pτt
, (1.47)





































tΘt are Lagrange multipliers associated with the borrower’s
resource constraint, law of motion of capital accumulation, and the collateral constraint,
respectively. The transversality conditions of foreign debt position and no-bubble condition
of price of physical capital hold with equality. The full equilibrium conditions of the model
are described in Appendix A1.2.
The Ramsey planner seeks to maximize the lifetime utility of the representative borrow-
ers. This is justified because the the Ramsey planner’s instrument, the nominal interest rate,
yields no effect on the arbitrageurs’ welfare, as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.5.3 The sequence of variables {cτat , r∗t , dat } is independent of the domestic
nominal interest rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.4.
As in model in section 1.3, the Ramsey equilibrium of the arbitrageurs-borrowers model (the
AB model hereafter) ensures zero inflation in the nonstochastic steady state.
Proposition 1.5.4 There is zero inflation in the Ramsey optimal steady state in the AB
Model.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.5.
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Table 1.4: The Ramsey Steady States, The AB Model











0 4.0 1.11 0.88 0.11 4.60 0.89 0.11
Notes. Variable pin refers to the annualized net inflation rate in the nontradable sector (in per-
cent) and i refers to the annualized net nominal interest rate (in percent). Variable e refers to real













yn refer to the consumption-output ratio and investment-output ratio in the
nontradable sector, respectively.
Table 1.4 shows that the key variables in the AB model. The calibrated parameters are
described in Table A.2 in Appendix A.4. In the Ramsey steady state, the annual inflation
rate in the nontradable sector is zero and the nominal interest rate is the same as in the
models in section 1.3. The steady state real exchange rate, e, is 1.11, and the percentage
of borrowers’ consumption in income, c
b
yb
× 100, where yb = yτb + yn, is 88, the percentage
of aggregate investment in borrowers’ income, iv
yb
× 100, is 11, and the capital-income ratio
of borrowers, k
yb








× 100, is 11. All the values are consistent with the values in the Tos˘ovsky´ model
in section 1.3, except the capital-income ratio, which is slightly greater than the one in the
Tos˘ovsky´ model, 4.49. This is because the external debt position of the borrowers in the
steady state the AB model is different due to the local currency denominated debt.
Table 1.5: Unconditional Second Moments, The AB Model




σ (it) ρ (it, y
τ
t )
0.38 8.70 3.81 0.82
Notes. Symbol σ(x) refers to the standard deviation of variable x in percentage points. Symbol
ρ(x, y) refers to the correlation coefficient between variables x and y.
Table 1.5 shows the unconditional second moments of variables of interest in the AB
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model. First, the standard deviation of the annual inflation rate in the nontradable sector
is 0.38 percentage points, which is much smaller than the one in the Tos˘ovsky´ model, 4.42.
The standard deviation of the annualized nominal interest rate, is 3.81 percentage points
which is also smaller than the one in the Tos˘ovsky´ model, 9.52. The correlation coefficient
between the nominal interest rate and tradable endowment is now 0.82 which is positive,
contrary to the negative value found in the Tos˘ovsky´ model, -0.62. Finally, the standard
deviation of the external debt position in the AB model is 8.70 percentage points, which is
greater than 4.10 percentage points in the Tos˘ovsky´ model. The results can be summarized
as follows:
Result 1.1.4 (The Effect of Local Currency Debt) If the external debt is domestic
currency denominated, the optimal monetary policy becomes counter-cyclical as in the con-
ventional framework without the Dilemma.
The result is intuitive in the sense that one source of the Tos˘ovsky´ Dilemma is the de-
coupling of prices of external debt and collateral. In the Tos˘ovsky´ model, external debt is
valued at the price in tradable goods, whereas collateral is valued at the price of nontradable
goods. Pricing is thus de-coupled and the real exchange rate generates a wealth effect on the
collateral constraint. This is not the case in the AB model because there is no de-coupling in
pricing between the debt and collateral since external debt is also assumed to be denominated
in the local currency. Thus, monetary policy in the AB model does not face the undesirable
effects of the exchange rate on the capital flows. As a consequence, the monetary policy
regime becomes counter-cyclical as is conventional wisdom in NK models.
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1.7 Ramsey Optimal Policies with Two Instruments
This section extends the model by including an additional policy instrument, namely a







t + ivt +
1 + it−1
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Table 1.6 shows the Ramsey steady state of the extended model. The model supports the
zero inflation rate as the Ramsey optimal outcome in the steady state.
Table 1.6: The Ramsey Steady States, Tos˘ovsky´ Model with Capital Controls










0 6.52 0.63 1.0719 0.88 0.11 4.39 0.89 0.11
Notes. Variable pin refers to the annualized net inflation rate in the nontradable sector (in percent),
i refers to the annualized net nominal interest rate (in percent), and τd refers to the tax rate on
external debt. Variable e refers to real exchange rate as nominal exchange rate divided by CPI price








yn refer to consumption-output ratio, investment-output ratio,
capital-output ratio, consumption-output ratio in the nontradable sector, and investment-output
ratio in the nontradable sector, respectively.
The dynamics in the Ramsey equilibrium in Table 1.7 show that the correlation between
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nominal interest rate and tradable endowment, ρ(it, y
τ
t ) is 0.82, which is positive. Recall that
the correlation was -0.62 in the Tos˘ovsky´ model with one instrument in section 1.5. The
correlation between the tax and external debt is 0.51, which implies that the tax works in
a countercyclical fashion as well. This implies that the coordination between financial and
monetary policy helps the interest rate policy regain a conventional counter-cyclical regime
towards price stability.
Table 1.7: Unconditional Second Moments, Tos˘ovsky´ Model with Capital Controls








τ dt , dt
)
3.35 18.8 0.82 0.51
Notes. Symbol σ(x) refers to the standard deviation of variable x in percentage points. Symbol
ρ(x, y) refers to the correlation coefficient between variables x and y.
Result 1.5 (The Effect of Policy Coordination) If capital control tax is used as an-
other Ramsey instrument, the optimal monetary policy becomes counter-cyclical as in the
conventional framework without the Dilemma.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates optimal monetary policy when an economy is subject to the Tos˘ovsky´
Dilemma. The optimal monetary policy from the model predicts a pro-cyclical monetary
policy response, which is paradoxical and contrasts with the conventional wisdom of mone-
tary policy in standard NK models. The optimal monetary policy aims to stabilize the asset
price, namely the price of collateral in terms of the tradable good, while allowing inflation in
the nontradable sector. The result shows that the primary objective of monetary policy is
achieving financial, rather than price stability. The prediction of this paper formalizes loose
arguments made by some policymakers in emerging economies for loosening monetary policy
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when facing an economic boom associated with capital inflows and real appreciation.
The model in this paper shows the polar case in which the conventional monetary policy
regime is disconnected from the concern of financial stability due to cross-border capital
flows. The conclusion of the model comes from the assumption of frictions in the financial
structure that create a strong wealth effect from the real exchange rate thus resulting in pro-
cyclical capital flows. In the real world, the degree of frictions can be moderate and can vary
across countries. The investigation of this case, however, clearly provides insight into the
existence of open economy-specific trade-offs for monetary policy in emerging economies,
which are absent in the standard NK models. The extensions of the model also predict
that local currency denominated external debt and adding capital control tax as another
instrument, enable monetary policy to once again be countercyclical towards price stability.
The findings of this paper encourage the empirical study of capital flows and monetary
policy in future work. There are empirical studies on the connection among domestic mone-
tary and financial policies and cross-border capital flows (see, for example, Ahmed and Zlate
(2013), Ghosh et al. (2016), and Ghosh et al. (2017)), but investigating the microstructure
of international financial markets is still needed. This extension is left for future research.
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Chapter 2
Business Cycles and Labor Shares in
Emerging Economies
2.1 Introduction
In modern economics, the labor share is the basic and fundamental measure of income
distribution of the economy. It is a well-known fact that modern growth theories and dynamic
macroeconomic models have been built based on the assumption of constant factor income
shares, which has been perceived as a conventional wisdom.
Recently, there have been several attempts to re-examine the conventional wisdom. One
branch of the attempts is studying the fluctuation of the labor share over the business cycle.
If the labor share has cyclical properties, then that indicates income distribution of the
economy has cyclical properties as well. That is because, the main sources of income of low
and middle-income groups are labor incomes, whereas most capital income generally belongs
to the high-income group.
Most studies on this topic have focused on advanced economies, including the United
States and Western Europe. There has been a wide consensus that the labor share is
highly countercyclical (see, for example, Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), R´ıos-Ruˇll and
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Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010), and Commission (2007)). The countercyclicality of the labor
share indicates that during an economic contraction, the labor share increases temporar-
ily above its long-run trend. Then major cost taker of the economic contraction becomes
the high income group since the capital income share shrinks. After the above works, the
countercyclicality of the labor share become another conventional wisdom.
Our research starts with a very simple question. Are these conventional wisdoms also
valid for emerging economies? There are few studies on this question, in spite of the fact
that emerging economies have more than a half of world GDP. Emerging economies take
peripheral status in the global economy, and it has been proven that business cycle facts in
the economies are qualitatively different from those in advanced economies. To answer our
question, we do a comprehensive cyclical analysis of labor shares around the world by using
a long period of data of 40 years. In this paper, we consider 15 emerging economies and 20
advanced economies and log quadratically detrend all series as our baseline study.
Strikingly, we learn that evidence around the world does not support the conventional
wisdom in general. Instead, we find three empirical regularities of labor shares movements
over the business cycle. First, labor shares are as volatile as output so they are rarely stable.
Both in emerging and advanced economies, relative standard deviations of labor shares with
respect to output are around one. Second, labor shares in emerging economies are about
twice as volatile as those in advanced economies. Average of standard deviations of labor
shares in emerging economies is 6.1 percentage point, whereas it is 3.3 percentage point in
advanced economies in our baseline study. Third, on average, labor shares are procyclical
in emerging economies and they are countercyclical in advanced economies. Average of
correlations between labor shares and output around emerging economies is 0.15, whereas it
is -0.14 in advanced economies.
To affirm the reliability of our deviation from the conventional wisdom, we consider
various issues those can potentially be pointed out. Most important one is the relevance of
practical measure of the labor share, especially in emerging economies. The bias from an
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omission of the self-employment sector is well-documented in the seminal paper of Gollin
(2002). labor share data which does not include labor income from self-employed sector can
give the misguided estimate of the actual labor share of the economy. However, we learn
that the point may not be a serious issue when we study cyclical component of the data
which is detrended. We compare cyclical properties between total labor share data (which
has self-employment omission issue) and corporate labor share data (which is free from the
issue). We find that cyclical components of two data have systematic correspondence.
Further, we check robustness issues. Low-frequency movement of the labor share is
extensively discussed in recent works (see, for example, Raurich et al. (2011), Elsby et al.
(2013), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Piketty (2014), Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2015)).
Also, We discuss the possibility of spurious results when the data is not detrended. We apply
other detrending methods and examine the sensitivity of our three empirical regularities.
Finally, we discuss the problem caused by the short sample and country choice, those are
potentially concerned in the contemporary work of Kabaca (2014).
Beside cyclical study, we also have a discussion on the suggested level of the labor share
for the emerging economy, which can be applied to a quantitative macroeconomic model.
By comparing several adjustments and their relevance, we propose the level labor share for
the emerging economy around 0.70.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes data, and
section 2.3 shows three empirical regularities of labor shares around the world. Section
2.4 discusses the validity of practical labor share measures for cyclical analysis, section 2.5
discusses some robustness issues, and section 2.6 discusses the level of the labor share in the
emerging economy. Section 2.7 concludes and closes the paper.
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2.2 Measuring The Labor Share and Data Sources
In empirical work on the labor share, one of the important issues is whether the data is well





where W is the wage, L is the labor force, and Y is the output or gross value added. Variables
W and Y can be valued either in real or in nominal. Gross value added splits into labor
income and capital income, so the labor share is the fraction of labor income in gross income
of the economy. In practice, by using national account data, the total labor share (hereafter
TLS) is calculated by
TLS =
Compensation of employees
GDP (at basic price)
1. (2.2)
System of National Account (SNA) offers the standard of measuring denominator and
numerator in right hand side, so we can access each component and calculate the TLS. And
since many countries around the world have recorded their national account data based on
SNA for many times, we can construct a long sample of the TLS.
One issue of the TLS, however, is the underestimation caused by omission of labor in-
come from the self-employment sector, which is pointed in Gollin (2002). SNA does not
have compensation for employees from the self-employed sector, such as sole proprietor and
unincorporated businesses. TLS treats all of the income as mixed income in which labor
income and capital income are not divided. The self-employment sector takes a significant
portion of the economy, especially in emerging and developing economies. For example,
1In numerator, compensation of employees contains (pre-tax) wage bills and salaries, and employer’s
welfare contribution for employed workers (sickness, accidents, and retirement, etc.). In the denominator,
GDP at basic (factor) price refers to the gross value added (GVA) of the economy. GDP at market (producer)
price is calcluated by adding net indirect taxes (sum of product taxes less subsidies) on products and imports
to the GDP at basic price. Hereby we denote GDP as GDP at basic price.
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from world development indicators (WDI), the percentage of workers among the total em-
ployees in Argentina, Mexico, and South Korea in the year of 2011 are 23%, 33%, and 28%,
respectively.
In consequence, the TLS tends to underestimate actual labor shares, and the underesti-
mation issue can be potentially severe in emerging and developing economies. There is no
simple and clear remedy, because it is implausible to extract labor income from the mixed
income exactly. We rely on indirect remedies, and the most famous remedy is to adjust the
TLS by assuming that average wage of the self-employed sector is same as the average wage
in the corporate sector. This is called the adjusted labor share (hereafter ALS) which is
calculated by
ALS =
Compensation of employees in corporate sector
Number of employees in corporate sector
· Total number of workforce
GDP
. (2.3)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) calculates the ALS
for its membership and some non-membership countries. In this paper, we use the ALS
primarily, as a conservative measure of the labor share. And for emerging economies which
don’t provide the ALS, we use the TLS as a secondary option. In section 2.4, we will discuss
the cyclical component of the TLS can be a good proxy for cyclical component of actual
labor share.
On the other hand, sufficient length of data is crucially needed for valid cyclical analysis.
As we will see in section 2.3, the labor share has evident low frequency movement in data.
Thus it is necessary to detrend the data to avoid spurious result from the low frequency
component. Long sample is needed to decompose secular component and cyclical component
properly. Cyclical analysis based on short sample can also induce spurious result, because
short sample includes short cycles of the economy.2 For this reason, in our analysis, we
restrict countries those can provide at least 30 years of the labor share data. Table 2.1
2Garc´ıa-Cicoo et al. (2010) also point the possibility of spurious results by using short data, when they
discuss Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
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provides the list of countries, types of labor share data, number of observations, and sources
of data. Countries are divided into two groups, those are emerging economies (hereafter
EMs) and advanced economies (hereafter ADVs).3. The frequency of all data is annual.
Table 2.1: List of Countries and Description of the labor share Data
EMs Type Periods Obs. Source ADVs Type Periods Obs. Source
Argentina TLS 1960-2006 47 GK Australia ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Bolivia TLS 1970-2011 42 UN Austria ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Chile TLS 1974-2011 38 UN Belgium ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Costa Rica TLS 1970-2011 42 UN Canada ALS 1970-2008 39 OECD
Greece ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD Denmark ALS 1966-2011 42 OECD
Mexico ALS 1970-2009 42 OECD Finland ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Peru TLS 1975-2005 31 KN France ALS 1960-2011 52 OECD
Portugal ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD Germany ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
South Africa TLS 1977-2011 35 UN Iceland ALS 1973-2011 39 OECD
South Korea ALS 1980-2011 32 OECD Ireland ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Spain ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD Italy ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Taiwan TLS 1981-2010 31 KN Japan ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Thailand TLS 1970-2011 42 UN Luxembourg ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Turkey ALS 1970-2006 37 OECD Netherlands ALS 1969-2011 43 OECD
Venezuela TLS 1970-2011 42 UN New Zealand ALS 1977-2009 33 OECD
Norway ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Sweden ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Switzerland ALS 1980-2011 32 OECD
United Kingdom ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
United States ALS 1970-2011 42 OECD
Mean 39.1 Mean 41.3
Notes. GK refers to Grena and Kennedy (2008), UN refers to United Nation database, and KN refers to
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) dataset. For Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, South Africa, Thailand, and
Venezuela, we calculate TLS using raw data of compensation of employees and gross value added (GDP at
basic price), from SNA database from United Nations.
There are 15 EMs and 20 ADVs in our data. Average number of observations of labor
shares is 39.1 years in EMs, and is 41.3 years in ADVs. All of the ALS data are collected from
OECD Statistics.4 We use full sample of the ALS data from OECD, except South Korea,
which we discard the periods of 1970s.5 The TLS come from various sources. For Argentina,
3For classifying emerging economies and advanced economies, we follow Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017)
4Available online at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=345. The name of the series is Labour
Income Share Ratios.
5The reason is because ALS in this period is substantially unreliable. The average ALS of South Korea
in 1970-1979 is 0.91 which is extremely high, whereas average TLS during the periods is only 0.34. Thus,
cyclical results including this period are very sensitive with marginal inclusion and exclusion of year of data
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we use data from Grena and Kennedy (2008). For Peru and Taiwan, we use the TLS from
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) dataset (hereafter KN dataset). For remaining countries,
we calculate the TLS by applying equation (2.2), using compensation for employees and
gross value added, from the United Nation (hereafter UN dataset).
To decompose secular and cyclical components, we apply log quadratic (hereafter LQ)
detrending method and Hodrick-Prescott (hereafter HP) filtering. In HP filtering, we set
λ = 100, following suggestion in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017) for annual series. Same
methods are applied to output. 6
2.3 Three Empirical Regularities
Using cyclical components of the labor share and output, we calculate standard deviation of
each variable, and correlations between the two. After getting second moments of individual
countries, we calculate the average of each second moments in EMs and in ADVs. And we
test null hypothesis that two second moments are same between the two groups, by applying
Student’s t test.
Table 2.2 shows the average and median second moments of labor shares (sL) and out-
put (y) in two groups. First, we can see that there is a striking difference in the volatility
of labor shares between the two groups. With LQ detrended series, average of standard
deviations of labor shares in EMs (σ(sL)
EMs) is 6.1 percentage point, whereas it is 3.3 per-
centage point in ADVs ((σ(sL)
ADV s). The ratio between the two average standard deviations
(σ(sL)
EMs/σ(sL)
ADV s) is 1.8, which is close to 2. HP detrended series also show similar re-
sults. Average of standard deviations of labor shares is 4.6 percentage point in EMs, and it
is 2.2 percentage point in ADVs, so the ratio between the two values of 2.0. For the volatility
of the periods. Thus we decide to use data after 1980.
6Real GDP per capita, with local currency unit (indicator code NY.GDP.PCAP.KN). All GDP data are
collected from WDI, except Taiwan. GDP data for Taiwan is collected from Penn World Table 7.1 (real gdp
per capita with PPP converted international dollar. Variable code rgdpch).
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of output, the excess volatility of output in EMs is well-documented as a stylized fact. 7
From these findings, we can see the ratio between average standard deviation of labor
shares and that of output (σ(sL)/σ(y)) is near 1 around the world. With LQ detrended
series, σ(sL)/σ(y) is 1.0 both in EMs and in ADVs, and with HP filtered series, σ(sL)/σ(y)
is 1.1 in EMs and is 1.0 in ADVs. These indicate that labor shares are volatile as much as
output around the world.
Finally, correlations between labor shares and output are not near-zero (as it is expected
in Cobb-Douglas production theory). They do have nonzero correlation and more impor-
tantly, the sign of correlations is different between the two groups. With LQ detrended series,
corr(y, sL) is 0.15 in EMs, and it is -0.14 in ADVs. With HP filtered series, corr(y, sL) gets
smaller but is still positive (0.09) in EMs, and it gets more negative in ADVs (-0.19).
Table 2.2: The labor share and GDP Per Capita: Second Moments
EMs ADVs




Average 6.1 1.0 0.15 3.3 1.0 -0.14 1.8
Median 4.3 0.9 0.16 2.9 0.8 -0.12 1.4
HP (λ = 100)
Average 4.6 1.1 0.09 2.2 1.0 -0.19 2.0
Median 3.8 1.0 0.09 1.8 0.8 -0.20 2.0
Notes. Variable sL is the cyclical component of the labor share, and y is the cyclical component of GDP per
capita. Symbol σ(·) refers to standard deviation of the variable, and corr(·, ·) refers to correlation between
two variables. Standard deviations are measured in percentage point.
These differences of standard deviations and correlations between EMs and ADVs are
statistically significant. Table 2.3 shows t-statistics under the null hypothesis that assumes
the second moments between EMs and ADVs are same. The t-statistics calculated under
equal variance assumption (t1) and unequal variance assumption (t2) both. Table 2.3 shows
that t-statistics with respect to σ(sL), and corr(y, sL) reject null hypothesis with less than
7Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017) find excess volatility of output in emerging economies, that is twice as
volatile as in advanced economies.
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5% significance level. 8












Notes. Null hypothesis assumes average second moment (σ(sL), σ(sL)/σ(y), corr(y, sL)) in each income
group (EMs and ADVs) are same. Variable t1 refers to t-statistics with equal variance assumption of each
moment. Variable t2 refers to t-statistics with unequal variance assumption. Asterisks **, *** refer to
rejection of null hypothesis with 5%, 1% significance level, respectively.
It is necessary to mention that we can see some exceptions in each income group if we
look at individual countries. Table 4 shows second moments for individual countries in EMs
and in ADVs. In EMs, Greece (-0.07 (LQ), -0.12 (HP)), Portugal (-0.04 (LQ), -0.24 (HP)),
8The t-statistic is calculated by applying
t1 =










(n1 − 1)S2XEMs + (n2 − 1)S2XADV s
nEMs + nADV s − 2 ,
where X¯i is the cross sectional average of second moments Xi in country group i ∈ {EMs,ADV s},




S2XADV s are sample variances of second moments of the groups. Variables nEMs and nADV s indicate the
total number of countries in EMs and ADVs, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, t1 follows Student’s
t-distribution with 2n− 2 degree of freedom, where n = nEMs+nADV s. With unequal variance assumption,
t-statistic is calculated by applying
t2 =



















2/(nEMs − 1) + (S2ADV s/nADV s)2/(nADV s − 1)
.
61
South Africa (-0.06 (LQ), -0.25 (HP)), and Venezuela (-0.11 (LQ), -0.21 (HP)) show negative
correlations. In ADVs, Australia (0.23 (LQ), 0.06 (HP)) and Iceland (0.41 (LQ), 0.72 (HP))
give positive correlations. In spite of these exceptions, the percentage of countries who have
positive corr(y, sL) is 60% with LQ and is 66% with HP in EMs. On the other hand, the
percentage of countries who have negative corr(y, sL) is 60% with LQ and is 90% with HP in
ADVs. The countercyclical labor shares is not major phenomenon in EMs whereas it surely
is in ADVs.
We can now build following three empirical regularities of the labor share fluctuation.
Fact 2.1. (Volatility of Labor Shares) labor shares are volatile as much as output around
the world.
Fact 2.2. (Excess Volatility of Labor Shares in Emerging Economies) labor shares
in emerging economies are about twice as volatile as labor shares in advanced economies.
Fact 2.3. (The Procyclicality of Labor Shares in Emerging Economies and The
Countercyclicality of labor shares in Advanced Economies) On average, correlation
between labor shares and output is positive in emerging economies, and it is negative in ad-
vanced economies.
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 visualize the empirical facts. Figure 2.1 shows historical move-
ments of labor shares in three typical emerging economies; Argentina, Mexico, and South
Korea. Before discussing cyclical properties, we should pay attention to the fact that labor
shares show low-frequency movements. In three panels of the first column, labor shares in
Mexico and South Korea show declining trend, although it is quite modest in Argentina.
These imply that cyclical analysis can be spurious if the data is not detrended.
Panels in the second column of Figure 2.1 show cyclical components of the data after
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Table 2.4: Second Moments of labor shares and GDP Per Capita: Individual Countries
LQ HP LQ HP
EMs σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) ADVs σ(y) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL)
Argentina 13.6 1.5 0.26 10.7 1.8 0.44 Australia 2.5 2.19 0.23 1.9 1.43 0.06
Bolivia 9.7 1.3 -0.04 7.7 2.3 0.17 Austria 5.6 2.13 0.21 2.3 4.56 -0.14
Chile 6.8 0.9 0.37 4.4 0.9 -0.14 Belgium 3.3 2.25 0.19 1.6 1.67 -0.12
Costa Rica 4.2 0.7 0.16 3.8 1.0 0.35 Canada 2.1 3.23 -0.62 1.4 2.21 -0.41
Greece 3.4 0.5 -0.07 3.0 0.8 -0.12 Denmark 2.4 2.89 -0.37 1.6 2.05 -0.29
Mexico 7.8 1.3 0.47 5.0 1.4 0.37 Finland 4.3 5.19 -0.12 2.4 3.65 -0.30
Peru 7.8 1.0 0.50 6.8 1.1 0.41 France 3.0 3.08 0.26 1.2 1.47 -0.50
Portugal 5.7 1.0 -0.04 4.3 1.2 -0.24 Germany 1.8 1.93 -0.09 1.4 1.71 -0.21
South Africa 3.1 0.7 -0.06 2.5 1.0 -0.25 Iceland 6.2 5.92 0.41 4.4 3.69 0.72
South Korea 3.2 1.0 0.25 2.3 0.9 0.35 Ireland 5.7 9.44 -0.70 3.5 3.32 -0.37
Spain 3.0 0.6 0.13 1.8 0.6 0.09 Italy 2.9 2.34 -0.67 1.4 1.76 -0.44
Taiwan 2.2 0.7 0.39 1.5 0.6 0.11 Japan 3.5 3.69 -0.74 1.7 2.11 -0.56
Thailand 4.3 0.5 -0.09 3.4 0.7 0.02 Luxembourg 6.2 7.20 -0.35 4.7 3.53 -0.09
Turkey 13.1 2.8 0.17 9.6 2.4 0.02 Netherlands 2.5 3.01 0.17 1.5 1.78 -0.09
Venezuela 4.1 0.5 -0.11 2.8 0.5 -0.21 New Zealand 2.9 3.48 -0.14 2.5 2.44 -0.13
Norway 4.8 2.93 -0.21 4.1 1.85 -0.02
Sweden 3.1 3.41 -0.00 2.6 2.49 -0.13
Switzerland 1.5 2.34 -0.31 1.4 1.88 -0.37
United Kingdom 2.2 3.58 -0.12 2.0 2.40 -0.19
United States 0.8 2.89 0.03 0.7 2.10 -0.21
Notes. Variable sL is the cyclical component of labor share, and y is the cyclical component of GDP per
capita. Symbol σ(·) refers to standard deviation of the variable, and corr(·, ·) refers to correlation between
the two variables. Standard deviations are measured in percentage point.
detrending. Cyclical component of the labor share in Argentina exhibits evident procyclical
movement. During 1980-1989, Argentine economy was fall in severe economic contraction
so called the Lost Decade (La De´cada Perdida). During the period, Argentina claimed
sovereign default in 1982 (which was along with Latin American debt crises), and experienced
hyperinflation crisis in 1989. After 21st century, Argentine economy crashed and defaulted
again in December 2002. Upper panel in the second column in Figure 1 shows that the labor
share in Argentina decreased about 30 percentage point in crises in 1982 and 1989, and was
below the mean throughout the Lost Decades, and decreased 15 percentage point during
debt crisis in the early 21st century.
Mexico is the same example. During 1982-1990, Mexico also experienced the Lost Decade
recession, and claimed sovereign default in 1982. And during 1994-1995, the Mexican Peso
Crisis broke out. During the Lost Decade, the labor share in Mexico decreased continuously
and the difference between 1982 and 1990 is almost 20 percentage point and there were
also big drop of the labor share in during the Peso Crisis. We can see there was almost 15
percentage point drop of the labor share compared to its local pick in 1994.
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In the case of South Korea, during 1997-2001 recession from the Asian Financial Crisis
in the late 1990s, the labor share dropped almost 5 percentage and recovered with the end
of the recession. And, during contraction in 2008-2010 from the Great Recession, the labor
share dropped almost 7 percentage point.
Figure 2.1: Labor Shares in Three Typical Emerging Economies



































































































South Korea, ls level and trend
















South Korea, ls cycle
Notes. In all panels, horizontal axes refer to year. In left panels, unit of vertical line is percentage deviation
from the mean. In right panels, unit of vertical line is percentage deviation from the trend. In left panels, blue
solid line refers to log-demeaned labor share, and red and green dashed lines refer to the secular components
of the log-demeaned labor share after applying log quadratic detrending and Hodrick-Prescott (hereafter
HP) filtering with weight parameter λ = 100, respectively. In all panels, grey filled areas indicate periods of
recession. Each row displays each individual country. labor shares are total labor shares (TLS) for Argentina,
and adjusted labor shares (ALS) for Mexico and South Korea.
In the United States, a typical advanced economy, however, the procylical pattern of
the labor share is not captured. Figure 2.2 shows the movement of the labor share in the
United States. We can also confirm that the labor share in the United States has also secular
movement which is declining (upper panel) so we detrend the data which is shown in the
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lower panel.
After 1970, the United States have experienced several major recessions. Oil crisis and
stock market crash during 1973-1974, the Volcker recession in 1980, early 1980s recession
during 1981-1982, early 1990s recession during 1990-1991, the collapse of dot-com bubble in
2000, and the Great Recession. Unlike three emerging economies above, cyclical component
of the labor share in the United States increased temporarily during the recessions. Further,
the volatility is smaller than three emerging examples. The magnitude of variation of cyclical
components is about 2 percentage point, whereas they are more than 10 percentage point in
Figure 2.1 countries.
Figure 2.2: Labor Share in the United States








































United States, ls cycle
Notes. In all panels, horizontal axes refer to year. In upper panel, unit of vertical line is percentage deviation
from the mean. In bottom panel, unit of vertical line is percentage deviation from the trend. In upper panel,
blue solid line refers to log-demeaned labor share, and red and green dashed lines refer to the secular
components of the Labor Share, after applying log quadratic detrending and Hodrick-Prescott (hereafter
HP) filtering with weight parameter λ = 100, respectively. In lower panel, red and green dashed lines refer
to the cyclical component of the log demeaned Labor Share. In all panels, grey filled areas indicates periods
of recession. Magenta dashed lines refer to single-year recessions. The labor share is the adjusted labor share
(ALS).
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2.4 The Validity of the TLS for Cyclical Analysis
As Table 2.1 shows, we use the TLS for 9 emerging countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa
Rica, Peru, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela) since the ALS for those countries
is not available. A natural concern is whether the TLS can represent the cyclical behavior
of the actual labor share. In this section, we will show that the TLS is a valid proxy for
cyclical analysis since it traces the cyclical fluctuation of clean measure of the labor share
satisfactory, in spite of its underestimation issue in level pointed in Gollin (2002).




















































Notes. Left panel exhibits log-demeaned labor share data, and right panel exhibits LQ detrended data. In
both panels, unit of horizontal line is year. In left panel, unit of vertical line is percentage deviation from the
mean. In right panel, unit of vertical line is percentage deviation from the trend. Blue solid line is the total
labor share (TLS), red dashed line is the adjusted labor share (ALS), and green dashed line is the corporate
labor share (CLS).
Figure 2.3 shows dynamics of three different labor share data in Mexico, during 1993-
2009. For both panels, blue solid line refers to the ALS and red dashed line refers to the TLS.
Green dashed line refers to the corporate labor share (hereafter CLS), which is calculated as
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CLS =
Compensation for employees in corporate sector
Value added output in corporate sector
. (2.4)
These three labor share measures exhibit similar up-and-down patterns during overlapping
periods. All of log-demeaned measures in left panel share significant drops in 1995, the year
of peso crisis and reach troughs in 1996. Also, all of them begin to decrease in 2003, and
reach troughs in 2008. Cyclical components in right panel share similar patterns as well. All
three detrended data drop in 1995 and reach troughs in 1996. And they still closely co-move
after then. These motivate the idea that cyclical component of the TLS is a valid proxy for
cyclical component of the actual labor share.
In the remaining part of this section, we compare cyclical components between the TLS
and the CLS around the world, to examine the idea precisely. Reasons behind choosing
the CLS (not ALS) as a counterpart of the TLS are the following. First, the availability
of the data. Thanks to comprehensive work in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), we can
access the CLS dataset in many emerging economies from KN dataset even if the ALS is not
available for those countries. Second, the CLS is a clean measure for the labor share in the
corporate sector and so it is free from self-employment omission bias problem. Compensation
of employees in the TLS contains compensation of employees in the corporate sector and
government sector. If we admit that compensation of employees in government sector is
relatively negligible, the TLS can be interpreted as a noisy measure of the CLS. Thus, by
comparing cyclical components of these two measures we can check whether the noise distorts
actual cyclical behavior or not.
We collect countries that have at least 15 years of the CLS and the TLS. We have 26
countries in EMs and 13 countries in ADVs. Table B.1 in Appendix B describes the list
of countries, descriptions of the CLS and the TLS. Number of observation is smaller than
samples in Table 1, since samples of the CLS in KN dataset is relatively shorter than those of
the TLS. We compare the cyclical components of the CLS and the TLS within overlapping
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periods.
Table 2.5: Average of Correlations between Cyclical Components of the TLS and the CLS
EMs ADVs
corr(sTLS, sCLS)LQ 0.66 0.93
number of outlier 4 0
corr(sTLS, sCLS)LQ without outlier 0.79 0.93
corr(sTLS, sCLS)HP 0.63 0.93
number of outlier 4 0
corr(sTLS, sCLS)HP without outlier 0.76 0.93
Notes. Variables sTLS and sCLS refer to cyclical component of the TLS and the CLS, respectively. LQ
detrending and HP filtering (λ = 100) are used. For all detrending methods, outliers in EMs are Brazil,
China, Colombia, and Tunisia.
Table 2.5 shows the results. With LQ detrended series, correlation between sTLS and sCLS
is 0.65 in EMs, and it is 0.93 in ADVs. There are four outliers in EMs whose correlations
are less than 0.3 (Brazil (0.17), China (0.28), Colombia (-0.70), and Tunisia (0.13)). If we
exclude those outliers, average correlation in EMs jumps to 0.79. HP filtered series gives
similar result. Variable corr(sTLS, sCLS) in EMs is 0.63, and it is 0.93 in ADVs. If we exclude
same 4 outliers in EMs (Brazil (-0.09), China (0.24), Colombia (-0.69), and Tunisia (0.15)),
then average correlation in EMs becomes 0.76.
Figure 2.4 shows scatter plots of corr(y, sCLS) and corr(y, sTLS). All series are LQ
detrended, and above four outliers are excluded from EMs. In EMs, when we regress
corr(y, sTLS) on corr(y, sCLS) with constant, we get slope of 0.71, and goodness of fit is
R2 = 0.47. These indicate strong and significant positive relation. In ADVs, the relation-
ship gets stronger. The regression coefficient is 0.86 and goodness of fit is R2 = 0.79. Thus
cyclical components of the TLS and the CLS are very closely correlated and we can expect
that Fact 2.3 is not sensitive to the change of the labor share data.
In addition, Table 2.6 shows average standard deviations of sCLS and sTLS in the over-
lapping periods. First, we can find that average volatility of sCLS is uniformly less than sTLS
(regardless of detrending methods and income groups), which indicates relatively smaller
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Figure 2.4: Scatter Plots of corr(y, sCLS) and corr(y, sTLS)






































Notes. In both panels, horizontal axes are correlation between output and the CLS, and vertical axes are
correlation between output and the TLS. All variables are LQ detrended. Grey linear lines are regression
lines. Regressions include intercepts.




CLS TLS CLS TLS CLS TLS
LQ
σ(sL) 6.1 4.2 3.1 2.3 1.9 1.7
σ(sL)/σ(y) 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.8
HP
σ(sL) 5.8 3.9 2.5 2.0 2.2 1.9
σ(sL)/σ(y) 1.3 0.9 1.2 0.9
Notes. The calculation is based on overlapping periods of two data. Standard deviations are measured in
percentage point. Sixth and seventh columns show ratios between average standard deviation of the labor
share in EMs and in ADVs.
volatility of the self-employed sector. As we can see in equation (2.4), the denominator in
the equation for the CLS is value added in corporate sector, whereas that in the TLS is gross
value added of the nation, which includes value added in the self-employed sector.9 Never-
9The potential mechanism is the labor reallocation between the corporate sector and the self-employed
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theless, the excess volatility of the CLS compared with the TLS is not huge and σCLS/σy is




in EMs and 2.2 in ADVs, those are near 2.2. Thus the Facts 2.1 - 2.2 are not sensitive to
the change of the data.
In sum, the TLS is a good proxy for cyclical study of the actual labor share.
2.5 Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of the Facts 2.1 - 2.3 in chapter 2.3 from detrending
and the number of samples. In sections 2.5.1 - 2.5.2, we discuss how the results change if we
do not detrend the labor share data or apply other minor detrending methods. In addition, in
section 2.5.3, we discuss that cyclical analysis based on short samples can generate imprecise
results.
2.5.1 Non-Detrended Labor Shares
In section 2.3, not only output but labor shares are detrended, since we find Labor Shares
have evident low frequency movements. However, stationarity (constancy) of the labor share
in the long-run has been a conventional wisdom after influential work in Kaldor (1961). It is
worthy to keep in mind that even if the benchmark is tremendously controversial, especially
in recent decades. This section we assume that the income share itself is a stationary variable.
We redo the same exercises of section 2.3, by using log-demeaned labor share.10 Output is
detrended.
Table 2.7 shows average and median of second moments. With log-demeaned labor
shares associated with detrended output (either LQ detrended or HP filtered), Fact 2.3
holds, whereas Facts 1-2 are not the cases. The ratios σ(sL)/σ(y) are a bit far from unity,
sector over the business cycle.
10The reason for using log-demeaned variable is to measure its volatility in percentage point.
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Table 2.7: Average and Median Second Moments: Non-Detrended Labor Shares
EMs ADVs
σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL)
EMs/σ(sL)
ADV s
Log Demeaned s, w/ yLQ
Average 9.9 1.6 0.09 6.3 2.0 -0.08 1.5
Median 7.3 1.5 0.09 7.1 1.4 -0.06 1.0
Log Demeaned s, w/ yHP
Average 9.9 4.6 0.07 6.3 4.8 -0.06 1.5
Median 7.3 3.8 0.07 7.1 3.6 -0.07 1.0
Notes. Variable sL is the cyclical component of the labor share, and y is the cyclical component of GDP per
capita. Symbol σ(·) refers to standard deviation of the variable, and corr(·, ·) refers to correlation between
two variables. Standard deviations are measured in percentage point.
and σ(sL)
EMs/σ(sL)
ADV s is 1.5 which a bit far from 2. If we take median, these discrepancies
of Facts 2.1 - 2.2 get worse.
Table 2.8: Second Moments of Individual Countries: Non-Detrended Labor Shares
yLQ yHP yLQ yHP
EMs σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) ADVs σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL)
Argentina 14.4 1.6 0.24 14.4 2.5 0.37 Australia 7.3 3.3 0.08 7.3 5.1 0.02
Bolivia 10.9 1.5 -0.38 10.9 3.3 0.13 Austria 13.6 6.4 0.09 13.6 8.7 0.01
Chile 7.3 0.9 0.34 7.3 1.5 0.22 Belgium 3.6 1.6 0.17 3.6 2.1 0.06
Costa Rica 7.2 1.2 0.09 7.2 1.9 0.20 Canada 3.7 1.1 -0.35 3.7 1.6 -0.22
Greece 10.6 1.6 -0.02 10.6 2.8 -0.04 Denmark 3.1 1.0 -0.28 3.1 1.5 -0.16
Mexico 16.0 2.7 0.23 16.0 4.5 0.18 Finland 7.1 1.3 -0.07 7.1 1.9 -0.13
Peru 15.6 2.0 0.25 15.6 2.5 0.23 France 7.5 2.4 0.10 7.5 5.1 -0.08
Portugal 5.9 1.0 -0.04 5.9 1.6 -0.10 Germany 3.9 2.0 -0.44 3.9 2.3 -0.05
South Africa 5.8 1.3 -0.03 5.8 2.4 -0.13 Iceland 8.5 1.4 0.30 8.5 2.3 0.46
South Korea 7.0 2.2 0.11 7.0 2.7 0.12 Ireland 10.7 1.1 -0.38 10.7 3.2 -0.26
Spain 6.0 1.2 0.06 6.0 2.1 0.07 Italy 8.4 3.5 -0.23 8.4 4.7 -0.11
Taiwan 4.4 1.4 0.19 4.4 1.8 0.17 Japan 7.3 1.9 -0.35 7.3 3.4 -0.20
Thailand 9.2 1.9 -0.12 9.2 3.4 -0.10 Luxembourg 7.0 0.9 -0.30 7.0 2.0 -0.11
Turkey 14.8 3.1 0.15 14.8 3.7 0.07 Netherlands 4.3 1.4 0.10 4.3 2.4 0.04
Venezuela 6.1 0.8 -0.07 6.1 1.0 -0.13 New Zealand 7.1 2.0 -0.05 7.1 2.9 -0.06
Norway 10.8 3.7 -0.09 10.8 5.8 -0.04
Sweden 4.8 1.4 0.00 4.8 1.9 -0.06
Switzerland 2.7 1.1 -0.17 2.7 1.4 -0.20
United Kingdom 2.5 0.7 -0.10 2.5 1.0 -0.13
United States 2.2 0.7 0.01 2.2 1.0 -0.05
Notes. Variable sL is the cyclical component of labor share, and y is the cyclical component of GDP per
capita. Symbol σ(·) refers to standard deviation of the variable, and corr(·, ·) refers to correlation between
the two variables. Standard deviations are measured in percentage point.
These results are clearly spurious, by the secular components of labor shares. The exis-
tence of low frequency movements is clear when we compare Table 2.4 and Table 2.8. Second
and fifth columns in Table 2.8 show that standard deviations of log-demeaned labor shares
in individual countries in EMs, and ninth and twelfth columns show those in ADVs. By
comparing the counterparts of LQ detrended labor shares in Table 2.2 (second and ninth
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columns), we can find that σ(sL)s with log demeaned data are far bigger than σ(sL)s with
LQ detrended data in EMs and in ADVs both. Especially, about 45 percent of each income
group (Greece, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and Thailand in EMs, Australia,
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and United States in ADVs)
have more than twice bigger labor share volatility, when we use log-demeaned data. The
fact that differences between variances of detrended and non-detrended data are too huge
indicates that a lot of proportion of the volatility of the non-detrended data come from the
low frequency movement of variables. This implies the necessity of detrending the labor
share data.
2.5.2 Alternative Detrending Methods
In this section, we apply other detrending methods. First, we apply λ = 6.25 for HP filter.
Second, we assume that the series have stochastic trends but log of each series are integrated
with order one, so their growth rates are stationary. Table 2.9 shows average and median of
second moments of the series. In the case of detrended series by HP filter with λ = 6.25, we
can verify that the Facts 2.1 - 2.2 hold well whereas Fact 2.3 doesn’t fit exactly. Correlations
between output and labor shares are near zero in EMs, and they are highly negative in ADVs
(-0.37 on average and -0.49 as a median). These phenomena also occur with log differenced
series. The Facts 2.1 - 2.2 also hold but correlations between output and labor shares are
near zero in EMs, whereas they are highly negative in ADVs (-0.28 on average, and -0.29 as
a median).
How should we interpret the violation of the Fact 2.3? First, these two alternative meth-
ods have some issues and may be inappropriate for cyclical study for emerging economies. As
Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017) discuss, HP filter with λ = 6.25 tends to treat many actual
cycles as a trend. 11 Log differencing have the same issue. Log differencing assumes all series
11For example, HP filter with λ = 6.25 attributes output drops in the 1989 crisis and 2001 sovereign default
in Argentina as secular phenomena, whereas they are considered as cyclical phenomena in many empirical
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Table 2.9: Average and Median of Second Moments: Alternative Detrending
EMs ADVs
σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL)
EMs/σ(sL)
ADV s
HP (λ = 6.25)
Average 3.2 1.5 -0.01 1.6 1.1 -0.37 2.0
Median 2.7 1.1 -0.01 1.3 0.9 -0.49 2.0
Growth Rate
Average 4.9 1.2 0.00 2.4 1.0 -0.28 2.0
Median 4.2 1.1 -0.06 1.9 0.9 -0.39 2.1
Notes. Variable sL is the cyclical component of the labor share, and y is the cyclical component of GDP per
capita. Symbol σ(·) refers to standard deviation of the variable, and corr(·, ·) refers to correlation between
two variables. Standard deviations are measured in percentage point.
have stochastic trends, and the assumption is not in other detrending methods. Deciding
which assumption is true is not a simple one. 12 Further, in spite of the violation of the Fact
3, we can still find a qualitative distinction between EMs and ADVs in individual level. In
EMs, about a half of countries have positive correlations, whereas 95 percent of countries in
ADVs have highly negative correlations. In addition, typical emerging countries in Figure 1
(Argentina, Mexico, and South Korea) and Bolivia, Costa Rica, Peru, who take 40 percent
of EMs, always have positive correlations, regardless of detrending methods. These implies
pervasive procyclical labor shares in EMs which is not in ADVs at all.
2.5.3 Short Samples and Choice of Countries
It should be discussed that the contemporary work in Kabaca (2014) also claims the Facts
2.2 - 2.3, by using the TLS data for 18 emerging and advanced economies. This may be
important since similar statements from contemporary studies can strengthen the power of
empirical regularities. However, there are potential problems that the way of collecting data
and choosing countries are not rigorous.
grounds.
12Nelson and Plosser (1982) initiate the issue, but it is shown that the issue is difficult to solve by the
following up studies.
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Table 2.10: Second Moments of Individual Countries: Alternative Detrending
HP (λ = 6.25) Growth Rate HP (λ = 6.25) Growth Rate
EMs σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) ADVs σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL)
Argentina 8.7 2.3 0.44 12.7 2.0 0.39 Australia 1.5 1.6 0.31 2.2 1.4 0.34
Bolivia 6.7 6.8 0.24 10.1 3.6 0.11 Austria 1.7 1.5 -0.43 3.0 1.6 -0.19
Chile 2.7 0.8 -0.36 4.2 0.8 -0.17 Belgium 0.8 0.7 -0.54 1.6 0.8 -0.16
Costa Rica 3.0 1.4 0.31 4.3 1.2 0.24 Canada 1.1 0.8 -0.57 1.5 0.7 -0.49
Greece 2.2 1.1 -0.01 3.4 0.9 -0.09 Denmark 1.3 0.9 -0.52 2.0 0.9 -0.48
Mexico 3.2 1.4 0.33 5.0 1.4 0.36 Finland 1.8 0.8 -0.52 2.8 0.9 -0.47
Peru 4.9 1.2 0.28 7.5 1.2 0.25 France 0.7 0.7 -0.63 1.2 0.6 -0.38
Portugal 3.1 1.4 -0.58 4.2 1.2 -0.40 Germany 1.0 0.8 -0.46 1.5 0.8 -0.41
South Africa 1.9 1.3 -0.18 2.9 1.1 -0.15 Iceland 3.3 1.5 0.63 4.8 1.4 0.52
South Korea 1.5 0.7 0.19 2.3 0.6 0.03 Ireland 2.4 1.4 -0.42 3.5 1.0 -0.41
Spain 0.8 0.7 -0.09 1.6 0.7 0.10 Italy 1.0 0.7 -0.58 1.6 0.7 -0.50
Taiwan 1.2 0.6 -0.29 2.1 0.6 -0.16 Japan 1.0 0.7 -0.72 1.9 0.7 -0.40
Thailand 1.8 0.9 -0.27 3.0 0.8 -0.26 Luxembourg 3.4 1.7 -0.47 5.4 1.5 -0.42
Turkey 5.2 2.1 0.00 8.1 2.0 -0.05 Netherlands 1.1 1.0 -0.51 1.8 1.0 -0.34
Venezuela 1.5 0.4 -0.26 2.6 0.4 -0.28 New Zealand 1.7 1.2 -0.03 2.5 1.1 -0.13
Norway 3.0 2.8 -0.11 4.5 2.3 -0.12
Sweden 1.5 1.0 -0.43 2.3 1.0 -0.34
Switzerland 1.1 0.9 -0.61 1.7 0.9 -0.58
United Kingdom 1.4 1.0 -0.56 1.9 0.8 -0.43
United States 0.5 0.4 -0.27 0.9 0.4 -0.23
Notes. Variable sL is the cyclical component of the labor share, and y is the cyclical component of GDP per
capita. Symbol σ(·) refers to standard deviation of the variable, and corr(·, ·) refers to correlation between
the two variables. Standard deviations are measured in percentage point.
Kabaca (2014) also uses an annual data, but the minimum requirement of observation
is only 10 years. In consequence, average length of labor shares in EMs is only 19 years,
and those mainly starts in early 1990s and ends in the year of the beginning of the Great
Recession. In the sample, typical Latin American countries, such as Argentina (1993-2007,
15 years), Brazil (1992-2007, 16 years), and Colombia (1992-2007, 16 years) do not contain
the samples in the Lost Decade, which it is the most important economic fluctuation in
Latin American history. Other emerging countries, Czech (1992-2008, 17 years), Hungary
(1995-2008, 14 years), Israel (1995-2007, 14 years), and Philippines (1992-2007, 16 years)
also have short observations. Egypt (1996-2006) has only 11 years of observations.
The short samples problem is directly related to the issue of choice of countries. If
minimum requirement of data is only 10 years, we can include more countries into EMs. By
using same sample requirement in Kabaca (2014), we expand the set of EMs which has 40
countries. We label this expanded group as 40 EMs.13 All data is the TLS, and we set the
earliest and latest years same as in Kabaca (2014), those are 1981 and 2008. Same windows
13Table B.2 in Appendix B shows countries those are in 40 EMs, and countries in 18 EMs as in Kabaca
(2014). For fair comparison, our 40 EMs excludes Greece and Spain since Kabaca (2014) classifies those
countries as advanced countries.
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are matched for same countries. We apply HP filter with λ = 6.25 which is used in the study.
Table 2.11: Average Second Moments by Choice of Countries
18 EMs 40 EMs 15 Baseline
corr(y, sL) 0.10 - 0.05 -0.01
σ(sL) 2.9 2.9 3.2
Notes. All series are detrended using HP filter with λ = 6.25. Group 18 EMs is the same set of EMs in
Kabaca (2014). Group 40 EMs is the expanded EMs. Group 15 Baseline is EMs has same data in Table 1
in section 2. Standard deviations are measured in percentage point.
Table 2.11 shows that the correlation gives different signs between the two different EMs
categories. Correlation between output and labor shares is 0.10 in 18 EMs, whereas it is -0.05
in 40 EMs. Thus 40 EMs produce almost acyclical labor shares, conditional on equal terms
with Kabaca (2014). Rather, second moments of 40 EMs are coherent to second moments
with the 15 EMs with 40 years of data which is -0.01.
Table 2.12: Average Second Moments: LQ and HP (λ = 100) Detrended Series
LQ HP (λ = 100)
18 EMs 40 EMs 15 Baseline 18 EMs 40 EMs 15 Baseline
corr(y, sL) 0.32 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.07 0.09
σ(sL) 4.7 4.6 6.1 4.2 4.3 4.6
σ(sL)/σ(yL) 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.1
Notes. Group 18 EMs is the same set of EMs in Kabaca (2014). Group 40 EMs is the expanded EMs.
Group 15 Baseline is EMs with same samples in Table 1 in section 2. Standard deviations are measured in
percentage point.
Additional exercise also shows the coherence between 15 Baseline and 40 EMs, and the
distance from 18 EMs. Table 2.12 shows average second moments with LQ detrended series
and HP filtered series with λ = 100. We can verify that regardless of two detrending
methods, corr(y, sL)s between 15 Baseline and 40 EMs are very similar, whereas corr(y, sL)
in 18 EMs is almost 2-3 times bigger than the former two. This indicates that collecting
sufficient number of observations, either long periods or many countries is crucial to reach
reliable numbers. Of course, it will be the best if we can approach both.
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Kabaca (2014) may give interesting perspective that labor shares in emerging economies
may not alike to those in advanced economies. However, the problem described above
prevents the perspective to be accepted as a rigorous empirical fact. In spite of this caveat,
it is also noteworthy that standard deviations of labor shares between two contemporary
works closely correspond each other.
2.6 Discussion on the Level of the Labor Share
So far, we investigate cyclical properties of the labor share in previous sections. In this sec-
tion, we turn our point and briefly discuss the level of the labor share in emerging economies.
The reason of this discussion is to suggest reasonable estimates of the labor share which can
be applied to quantitative macroeconomic model. We cannot not plug the TLS estimate
into the model because of its well-known underestimation issue.
One of suggestions from Gollin (2002) is to consider all of income from self-employed
sector as a labor income. We label this as Adj.1. In the real world, however, capital is also
used as a input in the self-employed sector as well, so we consider other variation by assuming
85 percent or 70 percent of income from self-employed sector is labor income. We label these
as Adj.2 and Adj.3, respectively. Finally, we assume that labor shares in corporate sector
and those in self-employed sector are same, which is also suggested in Gollin (2002). In
this case, we can use CLS itself. Table 2.13 shows the average and median of estimates for
emerging economies and advanced economies both.14 Countries and samples are same ones
those are used in section 2.4.
Table 2.13 shows that both in EMs and in ADVs, ranges of estimated level are quite wide
by adjustments. The range of average level of labor shares in EMs is [0.50, 0.73], and that
in ADVs is [0.61, 0.77]. Which values would be reasonable to take? In the business cycle
14We do not use the ALS in the exercise, since many of emerging economies don’t provide the ALS so we
cannot estimate cross sectional mean. For fair comparison, we do not use the ALS of advanced economies
neither but calculate four alternative measures in line with the case of emerging economies.
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Table 2.13: Average and Median of the Level of Labor Shares
EMs ADVs
Adj.1 Adj.2 Adj.3 CLS Adj.1 Adj.2 Adj.3 CLS
Average 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.50 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.61
Median 0.72 0.66 0.60 0.53 0.78 0.72 0.65 0.62
Notes. Indices Adj.1, Adj.2, and Adj.3 are calculated by applying formula
CLS·GDPcorporate+κ(GDP−GDPcorporate)
GDP , where κ = 1, 0.85, and 0.7, respectively. Average and median
are taken to the averages of time-series labor shares of individual countries. All raw data are from KN
database.
literature in advanced economies, values between 0.65-0.75 are usually taken, conditional on
specific environment of models used. Those values correspond to Adj.3-Adj.1. By picking
same adjustments to EMs, we can refine the range to [0.59-0.73] as a reasonable bound. Fur-
ther, by taking the fact that industries in emerging and developing countries are more labor
intensive than those in advanced economies, we can curtail the bound further. We suggest
the range of [0.66, 0.73] as a valid approximation of labor shares in emerging economies.
2.7 Conclusion
Over the business cycle, labor shares in emerging economies move differently from those
in advanced economies. Using labor shares data of 40 years, we propose three empirical
regularities of labor shares. Around the world, labor shares are rarely stable, but they are
as volatile as output. In addition, labor shares in emerging economies are twice as volatile
as those in advanced economies. Finally, labor shares are procyclical in emerging economies
but those are countercyclical in advanced economies. These three empirical facts indicate
that the labor share fluctuation is not as simple as the conventional wisdom.
These cyclical behaviors of labor shares offer important welfare implications. Business
cycles do have distributional impacts. Economic fluctuations change short-run composition
between labor income and capital income of the economy. The degree of change of the
composition is almost same as the magnitude of the economic fluctuation. This implies that
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the business cycle is the cycle not only for aggregate output, but also for distribution of the
economy and so inequality.
Further, the direction of the cyclicality indicates which income groups in the economy
suffer more from the economic contraction. Interestingly, the main cost taker may differ
between emerging and advanced economies. In emerging economies, low and middle income
groups whose main sources of income are labor incomes are major cost takers of the economic
contraction. In advanced economies, on the other hand, the high income group who holds
most of the capital income of the economy, is the major cost taker.
These empirical facts naturally lead us to the following question - why are they so?
Yet, we have few theoretical backgrounds that can account for this. This paper raises the
necessity of an appropriate theory and this will be partially addressed in next chapter.
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Chapter 3
A Model of the Labor Share
Fluctuation in Small Open Economies
3.1 Introduction
The labor share, namely the fraction of labor workers’ income to the gross income of a
country, is a fundamental measure of a country’s income distribution. Understanding the
evolution of the labor share during economic transitions was a major problem in political
economy. However, modern dynamic macro models left this problem largely untouched,
as the long-run constancy of the labor share was taken as the stylized empirical fact after
Kaldor (1961).
Recent studies challenge this notion. Some studies (see, for example, Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014) and Piketty (2014) focus on the declining long-run patterns of labor shares
over periods of economic growth. On the other hand, short-run studies (see, for example,
Andolfatto (1996), R´ıos-Ruˇll and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010), and Na (2015) show fluctuations
of labor shares over the business cycle. These studies indicate that the labor share does not
seem to be constant, but has substantial variation during economic transitions. Table 3.1
shows the various patterns of cyclical fluctuations of labor shares between two income groups
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around the world.
The problem is that standard business cycles models do not give good guidance to analyze
short-run labor share fluctuations - the frictionless neoclassical model cannot explain labor
share fluctuations at all. Other alternative models mainly rely on the construction of the
labor wedge - the gap between marginal productivity of labor and adjusted marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure - to generate a cyclical gap between marginal
productivity of labor and the real wage.1 Recently, however, it turns out that empirical
support of the labor wedge channels may not be deterministic or significant.2
This paper provides a different view of labor share fluctuations ignored by previous studies
by proposing two channels of labor share fluctuations over the business cycle: i) cyclical
variation of capital-labor ratios (substitution effect) and ii) cyclical variation of the relative
value of sectoral production (composition effect). The former implies that the production
functions of an economy do not need to have ‘unitary’ elasticities of substitution between
capital and labor, such as in stylized Cobb-Douglas production function. The latter has an
open economy context. The economy is composed of tradable and non-tradable sectors, and
production cycles in each sector are affected by both domestic and international factors. The
production cycles in the two sectors generate cyclical variations of sectoral shares to GDP,
which yield an additional margin of the labor share fluctuations in the domestic economy.
For quantitative evaluation, I estimate the model using a likelihood-based Bayesian tech-
nique. I use data from Canada and Mexico, as the two countries are typical advanced and
emerging small open economies with distinct cyclical features. The estimated models predict
the cyclical patterns of the labor share and other business cycle indicators successfully. The
1There are many approaches that can generate the labor wedge: i) imperfect competition with inattentive
price change and price markup variation (the sticky-price model), ii) search frictions in the labor market
and adjustment cost of labor (the search model), iii) firm-specific financial frictions with respect to the labor
cost (working-capital constraint).
2Nekarda and Ramey (2013) argue that price markups are not countercyclical as in the sticky-price model
using manufacturing industry data. Shimer (2005) argues that Mortensen-Pissarides type search models
predict only small unemployment fluctuations over the business cycle. Further, Chang and Ferna´ndez (2010)
and Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017) show that structural estimates of the working capital constraint on
labor are not statistically significant and have quantitatively unimportant effects on the business cycle.
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Table 3.1: The Labor Share Fluctuation over the Business Cycle
20 Advanced Countries 15 Emerging Countries
σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL) σ(sL)/σ(y) corr(y, sL) σ(sL)
EMs/σ(sL)
ADV s
Average 3.3 1.0 -0.14 6.1 1.0 0.15 1.8
Median 2.9 0.8 -0.12 4.3 0.9 0.16 1.4
Source: Na (2015). Notes. Data is at the annual frequency. All data have at least 30 years of observations.
All variables are log quadratically detrended. Variable sL is the cyclical component of the Labor Share,
and y is the cyclical component of GDP per capita. Symbol σ(·) refers to the standard deviation of the
variable, and corr(·, ·) refers to the correlation between two variables. Standard deviations are measured in
percentage points.
model shows a countercyclical and near-output volatile labor share in Canada, and shows
procyclical and excessively volatile (compared to output) labor share in Mexico, all of which
are consistent with the data. The models also match distinct patterns of business cycle
indicators of the countries such as the volatilities, correlations, and autocorrelations of the
indicators.
In addition, the two-sector model poses a caveat when we estimate the gross elasticity of
capital-labor substitution of an economy. The gross elasticity of capital-labor substitution of
the whole domestic economy has received a lot of attention in recent literatures in macroeco-
nomics and public economics. However, it is not a structural parameter of an economic model
if we consider the multi-sector environment. The model warns that the endogenous behavior
of economic indicators such as share of tradable sector, which has substantial cyclical prop-
erties, does affect the estimate of the gross elasticity of substitution. Thus, estimating the
gross elasticity with a one-sector production function and ignoring this internal transmission
mechanism would yield largely biased estimates, especially for small open economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops the model
environment. Section 3.3 explains the two channels of labor share fluctuations. Section 3.4
evaluates the model for Canada and Mexico and examines the performance of the predictions.
Section 3.5 proposes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the entire
economy by using estimated models. Section 3.6 closes the paper and poses questions for
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future research.
3.2 A Model with A Time Varying Labor Share
In this section, I develop a model with an endogenous time-varying labor share. The the-
oretical framework is a stylized two-sector small open economy business cycle model which
embeds a deterministic trend, CES production technology, and multiple shocks. I begin by
constructing the decentralized decisions of firms and households.
3.2.1 Firms
There are two types of sectors in the economy. Firms in the tradable sector produce tradable
goods, which are traded internationally. Firms in the nontradable sector on the other hand
produce nontradable goods, which only have domestic demand. Firms in the two sectors
use capital and labor as factor inputs and have the following constant elasticity substitution
(CES) production functions.













, j = T,N. (3.1)
where variables ajt , j = T,N denote Hicks-neutral technology (often referred to be the
stationary TFP) shocks in sectoral production. Assume that the natural logarithm of ajt
follows a first order Markov processes
ln ajt+1 = ρa,j ln at,j + 
a,j
t+1 j = T,N, (3.2)
where the parameters ρa,j ∈ (−1, 1), j = T,N govern the persistence of ln at,j, j = T,N ,
respectively. Similar to the previous exogenous processes, innovations a,Tt+1 and 
a,N
t+1 are
assumed to follow i.i.d. processes with mean zero and standard deviations σTa and σ
N
a ,
respectively. All shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other.
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In the production function, hjt , worked hours, is multiplied by the deterministic trend Xt.
3
The variable Xt is interpreted as nonstationary Harrod-neutral technology (often referred to
be the labor augmented technology). Then parameters σj ∈ [0,∞] represent the elasticities
of substitution between capital input Kjt and labor input Xth
j
t in the production. The
Harrod-neutral technology Xt can take a meaning of directed technological progress which
is defined in Acemoglu (2009) as follows.
Definition 3.2.1 (Directed Technological Change) Let the production function be given
by Y = F (fi, fj, X), where fi and fj are factor inputs and let X be a technology. The change
of the technology X is factor i-directed if an increase of X increases the relative marginal







∂X > 0. (3.3)
It is important to note that with CES production technology, the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor inputs, σj, determines whether labor augmented technological
change Xt is capital-directed or labor-directed. If σj < 1, capital and labor are gross com-
plements, and Xt is a labor-directed technology. If σj > 1, on the other hand, capital
and labor are gross substitutes, and Xt is a capital-directed technology. With σj = 1, the
















, j = T,N, (3.4)
and Xt is factor neutral so it becomes a Hicks-neutral technology as well. Now I impose the
following assumption on the σj and Xt.
3Some business cycle literatures (see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) study the case of stochastic
Xt which follows a random walk. However, my 40 years of data for model estimation is not sufficiently long
enough to verify this claim because studying the nonstationarity of a stochastic process requires substantially
long samples to prevent spurious results (see, for example, Garc´ıa-Cicoo et al. (2010) which use a century of
data for the study). As a consequence, the quantitative role of nonstationary Harrod-neutral productivity
shock to business cycles diverges across literatures. I thus exclude the case of stochastic trend to prevent
our model from falling into the controversial discussion.
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Assumption 3.2.1 Firms share the common labor augmented technology, Xt, across sectors
but have different sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution σj.
The assumption of common Xt is consistent with the model environment because households
are assumed to be identical. More importantly, it guarantees the existence of a balanced
growth path,4, while different σj between two sectors is a natural assumption.
Goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive. Firms in each sector take the relative




t , and rental rates
of physical capital rTt and r
N
t as given as. In each period, firms in the tradable sector choose
{KTt , hTt } to maximize profits
ΠTt = Y
T
t −W Tt hTt − rTt KTt , (3.5)
and firms in the nontradable sector choose {KNt , hNt } to maximize
ΠNt = ptY
N
t −WNt hNt − rNt KNt . (3.6)
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∂Y Nt (a
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The assumption that all production functions are homogenous of degree one with respect to
4If each sector has a different Xt, then long-run growth of the economy is in general not balanced because
each sector grows at different rates. This non-balanced growth is discussed in Baumol (1967) and Acemoglu
and Guerrieri (2008) and is used to analyze structural change. However, I do not consider this case because
the focus of the present paper is on fluctuations at business cycles frequencies.
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factor inputs implies zero profits of all firms.
3.2.2 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households on a closed interval [0, 1].





















where Ct denotes a composite consumption good, which is given by the Armington aggregator















where CTt denotes consumption of tradable goods, C
N
t denotes consumption of nontradable
goods, ξ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, and χ is a parameter
related to the expenditure share. The variable hTt denotes hours worked in the tradable
sector and hNt denotes hours worked in the nontradable sector. The variable νt denotes a
preference shock which shifts the marginal utility of wealth, and ωT and ωN are parameters
related to the Frisch elasticities of labor supply in the tradable and nontradable sectors,
respectively. Variable st denotes an exogenous labor supply (reduced-form labor wedge)
shock. The variable Xt−1 denotes the labor augmented technology in period t−1. The labor
augmented technology is deterministic and grows at rate g. 5
5We multiply the labor-augmented technology with the labor supply disutility in the model to generate
a balanced growth path.
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All values are expressed in terms of tradable goods. The variable pt denotes the relative
real price of nontradable goods. The variables ITt and I
N
t denote investments in physical
capital in the tradable and nontradable sectors, respectively. Similarly, KTt and K
N
t denote
the stocks of physical capital in the two sectors, which are owned by the households. The
variable Dt+1 denotes the households’ stock of outstanding external debt in period t which
due in period t + 1. The variables W Tt and W
N
t denote real wage rates in tradable and
nontradable sectors, and rTt and r
N
t denote real rates of return of physical capital stocks in
the two sectors, respectively. The variables ΠTt and Π
N
t denote profits from the two sectors
which are all owned by households. The variable r∗t denotes the country specific real interest
rate on the stock of the external debt Dt+1. The debt is denominated in tradable goods.
The parameters φT and φN govern cost elasticities of capital adjustment in each sector. The
sectoral physical capital stocks evolve via following laws of motion
KTt+1 = (1− δ)KTt + ιTt ITt , (3.14)
KNt+1 = (1− δ)KNt + ιNt INt , (3.15)
where the parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) is a common depreciation rate of capital stocks, and ιTt and
ιNt are marginal elasticies of investment (MEI) of the two sectors, where it is assumed that
the inverse of each ξTt ≡ ιTt −1, ξNt ≡ ιNt −1 follows











Laws of motion of preference and labor supply shocks are
ln νt+1 = ρν ln νt + 
ν
t+1, (3.18)
ln st+1 = ρs ln st + 
s
t+1, (3.19)
and the labor augmented technology evolves as follows.
Xt
Xt−1
= g, ∀t. (3.20)
It is also assumed that shocks νt+1 and 
s
t+1 follow i.i.d processes with zero means and standard
deviations σν and σs. I assume that the shocks are uncorrelated. Parameters ρν , ρs ∈ (−1, 1)
govern the persistence of variables νt and st, respectively.







t } as given, and chooses {Ct, CTt , CNt , ITt , INt , KTt+1, KNt+1, hTt , hNt , Dt+1} to
maximize his expected lifetime utility (3.11) subject to equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.15), and











t−1 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the sequential budget constraint












































































































































3.2.3 Frictions in International Financial Markets
I assume that this small open economy faces a financial friction when it trades financial assets
in the international market. I impose the following external debt-elastic country interest rate
(EDEIR) introduced by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003),






+ eµt−1 − 1, (3.30)
where D˜t+1 denotes the cross-sectional average of external debt of the economy in period
t, r¯∗ denotes the steady-state country-specific real interest rate, d¯ denotes the steady-state
detrended level of external debt, and y¯ denotes the steady-state detrended level of output.
The term r∗t − r¯∗ represents the country interest rate premium, which is the gap between the
country-specific interest rate and the world interest rate. The country premium characterizes
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the financial friction of the sovereign economy in the international financial market. The
parameter ψ > 0 denotes the elasticity of the country specific interest rate to the change of
the quantity in the parenthesis. Thus ψ represents the degree of financial frictions in the
short-run. The EDEIR is a stationarity inducing device for closing this small open economy
model.
The country interest rate is assumed to be subject to an exogenous shock, which is
denoted µt. As for the other shock processes, I assume it evolves by the following first-order
Markov process
lnµt+1 = ρµ lnµt + 
µ
t+1, (3.31)
where ρµ ∈ (−1, 1) governs the persistence of the shock and µt+1 is an i.i.d. innovation with
zero mean and standard deviation σµ, which is uncorrelated to other shocks.
3.2.4 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Since there is a continuum of identical households on the unit interval [0,1], the cross-sectional
average of the stock of external debt equals the stock of each individual’s external debt in
equilibrium. This means that
D˜t+1 = Dt+1. (3.32)
And since the sum of sectoral capital and labor should equal aggregate capital and labor to
















Since all upper case variables are nonstationary, I stationarize the variables by removing
the deterministic trend, by dividing all upper case variables by Xt−1. The trend-removed
variables are denoted by lower case letters. That is, vt = Vt/Xt−1 for any variables Vt which
has a deterministic trend. Then previous equilibrium conditions are transformed into the
stationary versions of the first-order conditions, sequential budget constraint, market clear-
ing conditions, and transversality condition subject to the initial conditions of endogenous
state variables {kT−1, kN−1, d−1} and sequence of exogenous shocks {aTt , aNt , ξTt , ξNt , r∗t , νt, st}∞t=0.
Appendix C.1 describes the stationary competitive equilibrium in detail. Recall that the
economy with the competitive equilibrium evolves along the balanced growth path which is
defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.2 (Balanced Growth Path) The balanced growth path (BGP) is the dy-
namic competitive equilibrium that features long-run relationships of equal aggregate output-
consumption-investment growths, and constant capital-output ratio, real interest rate, and
factor shares.
3.3 The Labor Share and Its Fluctuation over the Busi-
ness Cycle
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The following lemma shows that labor shares in the tradable and nontradable sectors (equa-




(where kt = Kt/Xt−1), and σj, the elasticities of substitutions between




Lemma 3.3.1 (Sectoral Labor Shares) The sectoral labor shares in the tradable and
nontradable sectors are given by
sh,Tt =
1− αT




















Proof. See Appendix C.2.1.
Lemma 3.3.1 indicates that the sectoral labor shares are time varying along the variation
of sectoral capital-labor ratios,
kjt
hjt
, as long as σj 6= 1, that is as long as the elasticity of
substitution is not unitary. Further, the lemma shows that the direction of the fluctuations
of sectoral labor shares with respect to fluctuations of the capital-labor ratios changes sign











. If σj = 1, the Cobb-Douglas case, s
h,j
t becomes time invariant and equal
to 1− αj.
We next turn to the aggregate labor share sht of the entire economy.










6I use a term ‘effective’ as a labor-augmented technology unit (i.e., effective capital kt = Kt/Xt−1). I will




t + (1− γTt )sh,Nt , (3.42)
where
Yt ≡ Y Tt + ptY Nt






Y Tt + ptY
N
t
is the tradable sector production share of the gross value added of the economy.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.2.
Lemma 3.3.2 shows that there are three time varying components on the right hand side,
sh,Tt , s
h,N
t , and γ
T
t , which means that there are two margins of fluctuations of the aggregate
labor share over the business cycle. The first margin is the fluctuation of sectoral labor
shares sh,Tt , s
h,N
t caused by the fluctuations of sectoral capital-labor ratios, which I refer to as
the substitution effect. The second margin is the fluctuation of the share of tradable sector
γTt caused by the fluctuations of the relative market value between tradable and nontradable
sectors, which I refer to as the composition effect.7
Next I describe the fluctuations of the sectoral labor shares and the aggregate labor share
over the business cycle in more detail.
3.3.1 Fluctuations of Sectoral Labor Shares
In this subsection, I show how the variation of sectoral capital-labor ratios, the substitution




7Remark that regardless of the fluctuation of labor shares in the short-run, they are all constant in the
nonstochastic steady state since the stationary competitive equilibrium along BGP ensures the constancy.
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ratios. A log-linear approximation of equations (3.40)-(3.41) yields
sˆh,jt = M






















and θj is the steady state value of θt. Then the following lemma describes the fluctuations
of sectoral labor shares over the business cycle.
Lemma 3.3.3 (Cyclical Fluctuations of Sectoral Labor Shares) The correlation be-

















if M j < 0
0 if M j = 0
, j = T,N, (3.45)














, j = T,N. (3.46)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.3.
An important question from lemma 3.3 is what sign are the unconditional correlations be-





. They are very likely to be
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negative (so the sectoral capital-labor ratios are countercyclical) since capital stock evolves
slowly compared to labor over the business cycle as documented in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999).8
Another important question is the relationship between the coefficient, M j, and the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, σj. Recall that in equation (3.44), we
can see that M j2 is always positive, whereas the sign of M
j
1 depends on the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution σj. If σj < 1, M
j
1 is positive, whereas if σj > 1, M
j
1 is negative. It
is zero if σj = 1. The characteristics of M





, govern fluctuations of
sectoral labor shares. Figure 1 shows the functional relationships between sectoral elasticity
of capital-labor substitution, σj, and the coefficient, M
j. The coefficient, M j monotonically
decreases as σj increases. And given the threshold of σj = 1, M
j on the left side is positive
and the one on the right side is negative. The pattern is the same with the two sectors.
The intuition is simple: the elasticity of capital-labor substitution refers to how the ratio
between capital and labor changes when the ratio of their marginal products changes. This
is represented by the expression




















where the last equality comes from competitive and frictionless sectoral factor markets. We







Equation (3.47) shows that given a one percent increase of capital-labor ratio (kj/hj), the
relative price of the factors (wj/rj) increases by more than one percent if σj < 1, less
than one percent if σj > 1, and exactly one percent if σj = 1. Then, given the growth
8However, it is noteworthy that negativity is not perfectly guaranteed in the multi-sector economy in
principle because of a sectoral reallocation of factors. If elasticity of substitutions between capital and labor
are substantially high and the sectoral productivity shocks are substantially persistent, the inflow and outflow
of capital in a sector (say, sector T) can be faster than those of labor by the reallocation of factors from the
other sector (say, sector N).
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Figure 3.1: Coefficient M j Conditional on the Elasticity of Substitution between Capital
and Labor
σj














Note. In this example, g = 1.01. Steady state values θj , αj are computed for each σj , to match four moment
restrictions ¯tb/y = 0.01, γT = 0.43, sh = 0.7, sh,T = 0.75.
of a sector’s capital-labor ratio, the sectoral labor share increases if σj < 1, decreases if
σj > 1, and remains unchanged if σj = 1. Thus, conditional on the normal scenario of




), sectoral labor shares sˆh,jt
become countercyclical (procyclical, constant) if and only if sectoral capital-labor elasticities
σj are less than (greater than, equal to) one.
The lemma also shows that the deviation of σj from unity also affects the volatility of
sectoral labor shares. The variance of a sectoral labor share is an increasing function of the
square of M j, given a variance of the capital-labor ratio, and Figure 3.1 implies that this
squared term gets bigger as σj gets farther from 1.
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3.3.2 Fluctuation of the Aggregate Labor Share
The substitution effect determines sectoral labor shares fluctuation. To fully account for
the fluctuation of the aggregate labor share of the economy, however, we should take into
account another macroeconomic margin, which is the change of the relative size between the









γT (sh,T − sh,N)
sh
γˆTt , (3.48)
where γT is the steady state value of the share of the tradable sector, γTt . In equation (3.48),
the first two terms on the right hand side represent fluctuations of sectoral labor shares via
substitution effect in section 3.3.1, and the last term reflects the fluctuation of the relative
size of the two sectors, which I name the composition effect. The following proposition shows
the cyclical fluctuation of the aggregate labor share over the business cycle.
Proposition 3.3.4 (Cyclical Fluctuation of the Aggregate Labor Share) The cor-


































































































Proof. See Appendix C.2.4.

















, and covst, plays a role in determining the cyclicality








. It follows that we
should know how the composition effect works quantitatively, or more specifically, the signs









. Remark that all coefficients of the substitution effect ΦT ,ΦN ,ΨT , and ΨN are
nonnegative by themselves, but the signs of the coefficients Φγ and Ψγ depend on the sign of
sh,T − sh,N , which is the steady-state difference between the labor shares in the tradable and










only if sh,T − sh,N is positive (negative, zero). Empirical studies typically yield estimates of


























, the data also provide useful
information. Table 3.2 shows the mean of the moments between the two income groups
(emerging and advanced) around the world.9 The first column shows that the share of
9Table 3.2 is constructed by the following steps. The raw data of the share of the tradable sector is
collected from UNCTAD database. By summing the shares of value added of agriculture, hunting, forestry,
fishing and industry to GDP, I construct the annual share of tradable sector from 1970 to 2011. I consider 15
emerging economies (Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, China (Taiwan Province of), Costa
Rica, Greece, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela
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the tradable sector (γTt ) in the emerging group is higher than the advanced group by ten
percentage points on average. The second column shows that the share of tradable sectors
are procyclical around the world, with that of advanced economies twice as procyclical as
in emerging economies. In fact, five countries in the emerging group (Argentina (-0.09),
Bolivia (-0.30), Costa Rica (-0.16), Mexico (-0.10), South Africa (-0.28)) and two countries
in the advanced group (Australia (-0.14), Norway (-0.18)) in our sample have countercyclical
tradable shares. The third and fourth columns indicate that the volatilities of the tradable
share are similar between the two groups, relative volatilities to the aggregate labor share
is far greater than one, and the relative volatility in advanced economies is about twice as
large as in emerging economies.
In sum, proposition 3.3.4 provides us the comprehensive dimensions of aggregate labor
share fluctuations. Conditional on the given substitution effect and negative Φγ, the composi-




is positive (negative). And conditional on the given composition effect and countercyclical




, each sectoral labor share yields a countercyclical
(procyclical) aggregate labor share if and only if σj is less (greater) than one. There is no
causal relationship between the two effects - they may be the same or opposite direction.
It is noteworthy that if the substitution effect is eliminated (σj = 1), the aggregate labor
share becomes
sht = (1− αT )γTt + (1− αN)(1− γTt ), (3.51)
and a log linear approximation of the above equation yields the fluctuation of the aggregate
(Bolivarian Rep. of)) and 19 advanced economies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, United States). GDP per capita is collected from World Development Indicators
(constant local currency unit, code: NY.GDP.PCAP.KN) except Taiwan. GDP of Taiwan is collected from
Penn World Table 8.0, by dividing output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (rgdpo) by populations (pop).
To calculate historical means, I take an average of time series in each country and then take an average of
country averages in each group.
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ADVs 0.35 0.26 0.16 3.29
EMs 0.44 0.12 0.14 1.77
Note. Variable γT is the historical mean share of the tradable sector, and variable gY is the growth rate of
GDP with a constant real exchange rate. Variables γˆTt and sˆ
h
t are log demeaned share of tradable sector
and the aggregate labor share. Symbol corr(·, ·) refers to the correlation coefficient, and σ(·) refers to the
standard deviation in percentage points.
labor share as the following form






where αN and αT now become sectoral capital share in nontradable and tradable sectors,
respectively. Equation (3.52) means that the fluctuation of the aggregate labor share is
proportional to the fluctuation of the share of tradable sector in the economy. This implies
that conditional on αN < αT (higher labor share in nontradable sector than tradable sector),

















∣∣∣ sh/γTαN−αT ∣∣∣, which are not supported by the data. I revisit this in section
3.4.3.
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I perform a quantitative analysis using the theoretical model described in
section 3.2. My method was as follows. First, I set some structural parameters based on
data and by following standard suggestions from the previous literature. Second, the model
is first-order approximated by a perturbation method, and I estimate remaining structural
parameters and other nonstructural ones of the model by using a likelihood-based Bayesian
method. Finally, using the estimated model with calibrated and estimated parameters, I
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examine the predictions of the model.10
The examination of model prediction contains how well the model matches the major
moments of the labor share from the data, whether the model’s predictions of the business
cycle are successful, and how the estimated model provides information about the source
of fluctuations of the labor share and other macroeconomic indicators. We care about not
only labor share but also the general performance for predicting business cycles because the
theoretical model is a business cycle model by itself. If the model’s predictions on the labor
share are reasonable, but predictions on the general business cycle statistics are poor, then
we should not be in favor of the model..
I estimate the model for two countries, Mexico and Canada. The former is a typical
emerging economy, and the latter is a typical advanced economy, both small-open economies.
3.4.1 Calibration
Calibrated parameters are divided into common parameters and country specific parameters.
For the common parameters, I set ωT = ωN = 1.455, γ = 2, and δ = 0.12, by taking common
values in standard business cycle literature. I set the elasticity of substitution between
tradables and nontradables, ξ to 0.5, by following Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017). For
Canada, I set r¯∗ = 0.066 by taking the mean of annualized net interest rate of government
bonds from 1948-2011. Parameter g is set to be 1.02, from the average of data from 1961-
2011. Capital intensity parameters in each sector, αT and αN are calibrated to match the
long-run sectoral labor shares and the aggregate labor share in the steady state.
There are four moment restrictions which pin down the steady state value of relative
price of nontradables pN , and 3 structural parameters αT , αN , χ, so the model is partially
10In this chapter, the estimated model is the benchmark model in chapter 3.3, but alternative model spec-
ifications are also considered. Appendix C.5 shows quantitative results from two other models: i) two sector
model with Cobb-Douglas production functions, ii) one sector model with CES production functions. The
purpose of the alternative models is to isolate the two effects in chapter 3.3 and to examine the performance
of a model with only one channel. The results indicate that the benchmark model in chapter 3.3 performs
best in predicting the cyclical patterns of the labor share and business cycles indicators of the two countries.
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reparametrized in terms of steady state moment restrictions rather than parameters. For
Canada, the restriction ¯tb/y = 0.0135 is based on the historical mean of trade balance to
output ratios from 1961-2011, and restrictions on sh,N and sh are based on the historical mean
of value-added averages of labor shares in construction and service sectors from 1970-2009,
and the historical mean of aggregate labor shares during same periods, respectively.
The calibration for Mexico is similar. For country specific parameters, I set r¯∗ = 0.10
following the value suggested in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017), and set g = 1.018 by
taking historical mean of Mexican GDP growth rates and trade balance to GDP ratios from
1961-2011. I set the steady state trade balance to output ratio ¯tb/y = −0.007 based on the
historical mean of Mexican trade balance to GDP ratio from 1960-2011. The steady state
labor share in the nontradable sector, sh,N , is set to 0.75 by taking estimates from Uribe
(1997) and the steady state aggregate labor share in the economy sh is set to 0.7 by taking
estimates from Na (2015). The steady state share of the tradable sector, γT , is set to 0.43 by
taking average of ratios of the sum of value added in agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing,
and industry to GDP from 1970-2011 from the UNCTAD database. Table 3.3 summarizes
all calibrated values.
3.4.2 Estimation
The estimation of the model is conducted via a likelihood based Bayesian method. To
construct likelihood function of the structural model, I use six observations: Growth rate
of GDP per capita, growth rate of consumption, growth rate of investment, trade balance
to output ratio, log demeaned aggregate labor share, and log demeaned share of tradable
sector.11 Data is annual (Canada: 1971-2009, Mexico: 1970-2009). I assume additive mea-
11Although some empirical work (e.g. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) focus on the trend of the labor
share, I do not detrend it in the quantitative study. There are couple of reasons. First, unlike other well
known nonstationary macroeconomic level indicators (such as GDP), the ratio indicators (such as factor
shares and trade balance to output ratio) are known to be stationary variables, and 40 years of data may not
be sufficient to make any conclusions. Here I would like to interpret the ‘trend’ as the ‘persistence’ instead.
Second and more importantly, if we observe that the labor share has a decreasing trend, it implies that it
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surement errors in all observables to prevent a potential degenerated likelihood function in
the Kalman filter iterations in the state space representation of observations of the linearized
model.
There are three classes of parameters to be estimated: (i) parameters related to steady
state solutions (ii) parameters related to endogenous propagation of shocks that do not
change steady state solutions, and (iii) parameters that govern exogenous shock processes.
Regardless of the classes of parameters, I assume that all prior distributions are uniform and
supports of the prior distribution are all wide. This implies there is no pre-experimental
information about the parameters. Thus the joint posterior distribution is mostly driven by
the likelihood function, so the Bayesian estimates become similar to the maximum likelihood
estimates. Also, since I assume measurement errors for observables, the standard deviation
of the measurement errors, which are nonstructural, should be estimated as well. I assume
uniform priors for measurement errors and impose a restriction that the maximum supports
converges to zero in the nonstochastic steady state. This is not a case that our economic model wants to
think about, because it generates spurious results from the approximated model via local approximation.
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Table 3.4: Marginal Prior and Posterior Distributions for Structural Parameters
Canada Mexico
Parameter Prior Posterior
Median [5%, 95 %] Median [5%, 95 %]
Steady State Related Parameters
σT Uniform [0, 10] 0.89 [0.75, 1.21] 0.95 [0.84, 1.54]
σN Uniform [0, 10] 0.49 [4.84, 8.51] 5.12 [2.34, 7.86]
Endogenous Propagation Parameters
φT Uniform [0, 50] 1.71 [0.28, 3.72] 28.4 [13.9, 46.1]
φN Uniform [0, 50] 5.95 [4.30, 7.57] 14.3 [12.7, 16.1]
ψ Uniform [0, 20] 5.92 [3.18, 9.38] 17.5 [12.0, 19.7]
Exogenous Shock Parameters
ρa,T Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.80 [0.69, 0.87] 0.90 [0.83, 0.95]
σa,T Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.035 [0.028, 0.045] 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]
ρa,N Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.44 [-0.65, 0.94] 0.98 [0.98, 0.98]
σa,N Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.001 [0.0002, 0.008] 0.037 [0.028, 0.047]
ρξ,T Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.82 [-0.43, 0.97] 0.30 [-0.70, 0.91]
σξ,T Uniform [0, 0.5] 0.009 [0.0007, 0.03] 0.004 [0.0005, 0.015]
ρξ,N Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.96 [0.93, 0.97] 0.75 [-0.40, 0.97]
σξ,N Uniform [0, 1] 0.38 [0.24, 0.48] 0.08 [0.0078, 0.41]
ρs Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.47 [-0.61, 0.93] 0.94 [0.85, 0.98]
σs Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.026 [0.006, 0.05] 0.69 [0.47, 0.96]
ρν Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.54 [0.20, 0.72] 0.84 [-0.52, 0.96]
σν Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.12 [0.08, 0.19] 0.08 [0.014, 0.13]
ρµ Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.88 [0.54, 0.97] 0.70 [0.55, 0.77]
σµ Uniform [0, 0.5] 0.16 [0.09, 0.28] 0.95 [0.71, 1.32]
Note. All prior distributions are uniform. Posterior distributions are based on draws from the last 1 million
draws from 10 million MCMC chain.
of standard deviations of measurement errors should be 6.25 % of the variances of observables.
Let θ = [σT , σN , φ










]′ be a vector of parameters to be estimated. For posterior sam-
pling, I construct 10 million MCMC chain for each country, via the random walk Metropolis-
Hastings sampler described in Herbst and Schorfheide (2016). The detailed procedure is
explained in appendix C.3.2. The construction of MCMC chain requires approximately 10
hours with Intel Core i5-4460 3.20GHz processor with 8 GB RAM.
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Table 3.4 shows summary statistics of the prior and simulated posterior distributions.
Unsurprisingly, posterior distributions are substantially different between the two countries,
in both endogenous propagation parameters and exogenous shock parameters. For sectoral
elasticies of capital-labor substitution, σT and σN , which govern sectoral variation of labor
shares, the estimation gives point estimates 0.89 and 0.49 for Canada, and 0.95 and 5.12
for Mexico. With calibrated parameters, these estimates yield heterogeneous quantitative
predictions from models which will be shown in the next section.
3.4.3 Predictions from Estimated Models
Table 3.5 summarizes the second moments that characterize business cycles and labor share
fluctuations. It shows that the estimated models perform well in matching the moments
with the data. First, the models predict a pattern of labor share fluctuations in line with
the data. Most importantly, the models predict cyclical behavior of labor shares, consistent
with the data. The models predict a near-output volatile labor share in Canada σ(sh)/σ(gY ),
and excessive volatility of labor share relative to output in Mexico. In addition, the models
predict a countercyclical labor share in Canada and procyclical labor share in Mexico. The




from the model for
Canada is -0.20 (-0.11 in data), and 0.09 (0.33 in data) for Mexico.
It is important to note that the model is able to predict cyclical patterns of the labor share
in line with the data without relying on the labor wedge channel. Each of the existing labor
wedges are intended to generate partial patterns of the labor share fluctuation. 12 Without
conclusive empirical support of the existence of these wedges, these prevent theories from
generating the general pattern of the labor share fluctuations. Our model, on the other
hand, is able to do generate the patterns by opening the new channels of the substitution
and composition effects.
12For example, search models in the labor market can only explain a countercyclical labor share, whereas
a working capital constraint of labor hiring can only account for procyclical labor shares.
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Table 3.5: Second Moments: Data and Model
Canada Mexico
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-0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.19







0.93 0.95 0.91 0.83
Note. Standard deviations are measured in percentage points. The prediction is based on the posterior
median from the last 1 million draws from 10 million MCMC chain.
The models also match general business cycle statistics successfully. For Canada, the
estimated model successfully matches key statistics such as investment more volatile han
output, the volatility of trade balance to output ratio, procyclical consumption and invest-
ment, and serial correlations of indicators. For Mexico, the model matches excess volatility
of consumption and investment, and a countercyclical trade balance to output ratio.13
13The estimated model naturally predicts the source of fluctuations of macroeconomic indicators. However,
unlike the second moments, the decomposition is sensitive to the calibration of σT and σN . Since we need
more work in determining the right values of σT and σN , I postpone the interpretation of the decomposition
result and put it into appendix C.5 (see Tables C.3 - C.4). However, all models consistently predict that
the importance of the labor supply (reduce-form labor wedge) shock to the variation of labor share is not of
primary importance.
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3.5 The Gross Elasticity of Substitution
Although the model has sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution σT , σN , there is a
gross elasticity of capital-labor substitution of an economy (which I denote σ henceforth).
Estimating the parameter σˆ is of interest due to the development of the CES production
function, but estimates were basically assumed from a one-sector production economy. Since
our model is two-sector open economy, σ is not a structural parameter at all. To get an
estimate of σ using the model, I simulate the estimated model. From the definition of the







a regression equation is specified such as





















t + (1− γTt )rNt ,
and t is a white noise process. I simulate 1 million series of each variable (after discarding
the first 100000 series) and get an OLS estimate σˆ of the equation (3.53). Table 3.7 exhibits
the estimates σˆ of the two countries in comparison to other literature. Our estimated models
show that σˆ is 0.61 in Canada and 2.53 in Mexico, which means that capital and labor are
gross substitutes in Mexico, whereas they are gross complements in Canada. It also implies
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Table 3.6: The Elasticity of Capital-Labor Substitution of the Economy
Source Model Antra´s (2004) Chirinko (2009) Raurich et al. (2014)
Country Canada Mexico U.S. U.S. Spain
σˆ 0.55 2.53 (0.4, 0.6) (0.6, 0.9) (1.12, 1.56)
Note. The second and three columns show estimates based on regressions with simulated data from estimated
models. The estimates from models are all statistically significant at 1 percent significance level.
that the labor-augmented technological progress, Xt, is capital-directed (see definition 2) in
Mexico but is labor-directed in Canada in aggregate level. Very interestingly, these estimates
are comparable to other estimates using different models and methods.
There have been many attempts to estimate σ using a CES production function, but the
estimates have a very wide range, depending on the specified model, data, and countries.
Nevertheless, there is a consensus that the estimates are less than one in typical advanced
countries. Chirinko (2009) surveys that estimates of σ in the United States have a range of
(0.4, 0.6), and the range depends on aggregate/plant level investment data, and specification
of the statistical model. Antra´s (2004) uses private sector and national account data of the
U.S. during 1948-1998, and suggests the typical range of elasticity (0.6, 0.9), based on CES
production function with factor-augmented technologies. Our model estimate for Canada,
0.55, is in line with those estimates. There are few empirical studies on estimating σ for
emerging countries, but we can document Raurich et al. (2011). By applying the same
methodology in Antra´s (2004) in Spain, they provide estimates of σ in the range of (1.12,
1.56) which is greater than 1. Our model estimate for Mexico, 2.53, is qualitatively in line
with this estimate. However, one important caveat from this exercise is that the estimate of
σ depends not only on σT and σN but also on the relative sectoral share γ
T
t which is time
varying and has a substantial cyclicality. This exercise poses a caveat that the estimate from
a one-sector economy would miss the important structure when we consider a small open
economy that has a non-negligible γTt with cyclical properties.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes an approach to understand labor share fluctuations over the business
cycle. Fluctuations of the labor share have important welfare implications as they reflect
variation of the income distribution along business cycles. Which income group’s (high,
middle, or low) income shrinks relatively more in an economic contraction? If we agree that
labor income is the main source of income for middle and low income groups, cyclicality of
the labor share would give an answer to this question. If the labor share is procyclical, a
contraction is more hostile to middle and low income groups, while the opposite holds if it
is countercyclical.
This paper finds that sectoral capital-labor substitution and variation of the relative
value of sectoral production are important factors of labor share fluctuations. These ingre-
dients however are not new. Capital-labor substitution has always been of interest since
the emergence of political economy and the two sector economy composed of tradable and
nontradable sectors is one of the standard setups in open-economy macroeconomics. The
contribution of this paper is to incorporate the ingredients within the language of dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium and provide a comprehensive view to better understand labor
share fluctuations without relying on the labor wedge approach. From estimated models
using reasonable parametrization, this paper predicts that the aggregate labor share is pro-
cyclical and is more volatile than output in Mexico. In Canada, on the other hand, it is
countercyclical and is as volatile as output. These findings are consistent with observations
from data, reflecting the success of the approach.
An important implication of this paper is the need to obtain micro-based estimates of
σT and σN . This is necessary not only for the accurate prediction of the model, but also
for estimating the correct gross elasticity of substitution of the economy. This is not well-
explored, especially in countries outside the U.S., and may require comprehensive work using
firm or micro-level data. I will leave this as a future research agenda.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Competitive Equilibrium
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1 = θ(1 + pint )










































































xt = θxt−1(1 + pint )
µ + (1− θ)(p¯nt )−µ, (A.20)
4. Foreign Interest Rate
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5. Exchange Rate Pass-Through
pτt = et, (A.22)
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A.1.2 The AB Model
1. Arbitrageurs
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xt = θxt−1(1 + pint )
µ + (1− θ)(p¯nt )−µ, (A.51)
4. Foreign Interest Rate








t−1 − 1, (A.52)
5. Exchange Rate Pass-Through
pτt = et, (A.53)
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A.2 Steady State Solutions
A.2.1 The Tos˘ovsky´ Model
Step 1. Under R = 1 + i,
yτ = y¯τ ,
d = the value implied by the IDEIR parameter
























Then under the given values of pn and h,
pτ =
[























1− βθ ( 1
1+pin
)−µ




























































































yn = cn + ivn,
we get












































































A.2.2 The AB Model
Step 1. Under given R = 1 + i,
yτ = y¯τ ,
da = the value implied by the IDEIR parameter






























Then under given value of pn and h,
pτ =
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cτb = yτ − ivτ − pi − i
pτ (1 + pi)
db,
and since
yn = cn + ivn,
we get



















































































The optimality condition of external debt is
λt (1−Θt) = βEt
[(










The equation in the nonstochastic steady state is then given by









The relevant competitive equilibrium constraints when the Ramsey planner decides pint and
pit are
1 = θ(1 + pint )










































xt = θxt−1 (1 + pint )
µ + (1− θ)(p¯nt )−µ
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where λR,jt , j = 1, 2, ..., 7 are Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints and the term
‘others’ refers to other remaining constraints with corresponding Lagrange multipliers. The
necessary first order conditions with respect to pint , pit, p¯
n
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− λR,2t − λR,3t = 0.
Let pin = 0. Then pi = 0, p¯n = 1, x = 1 and z, p¯n,mc, k, h, ivn, and cn are pinned down. The
first order conditions with the steady state solution then become
λR,2θµz + λR,3θµz + λR,1θ(µ− 1) + λR,4θµ− λR,5 = 0, (A.62)
λR,3θz = λR,5, (A.63)
λR,1(1− θ)(1− µ)− λR,2(1− θ)µz + λR,3(1− θ)(1− µ)z + λR,4(1− θ)(−µ) = 0 (A.64)
and
λR,2 = −λR,3. (A.65)
These collapse equations (A.62) and (A.64) to the identical equation
λR,1(1− µ) + λR,3 (µz + (1− µ)z)− λR,4µ = 0.

A.3.3 Proposition 1.5.2
The strategy of proof in this case is to prove that zero inflation rate in the competitive







subject to the following constraints







t − ivϕt − (1 + r∗t−1(dt−1))dt−1 + dt,
cnt = F(kt, ht)− τ − ivnt ,






















Now I turn into the competitive equilibrium. I set pint = 0 and τ
p
t = − 1µ−1 . Then p¯nt = 1 and
xt = 1 for all t ≥ 0. Guess that mct = µ−1µ pnt for all time. The guess is verified since this










in equilibrium. Then first
order conditions for ht, ivt, and kt+1 from the competitive equilibrium become
− U2(ct, ht)





















































and production in the nontradable sector satisfies
F(kt, ht)− ϕ = cnt + ivnt .
And since ivτt and iv
n
t in competitive equilibrium always satisfy
A(ivτt , iv
n
t ) = ivt,
equilibrium conditions in the competitive equilibrium with zero inflation become identical
to the equilibrium of the Pareto planner. Thus, zero inflation rate is Pareto optimal and
therefore it is Ramsey optimal for all t. It makes the standard model without the collateral
constraints collapses to the real model of current account without nominal variables.
A.3.4 Proposition 1.5.3
Recall the first order conditions of the arbitrageurs
Ua
′
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In equilibrium, the arbitrageur’s sequential budget constraint becomes











Combining (A.66) and (A.68) yields
Ua
′
(cτat ) = βa
(
1 + r∗t (d
∗











and because the foreign interest rate r∗t is internally determined by the debt elastic function,








t−1 − 1, (A.71)
the allocation {cτat , dat , r∗t } is identical to the solution that maximizes utility function subject
to (A.69) and (A.71) as constraints. Note that the simplified problem is invariant to the




t , are also
independent of the domestic nominal interest rate.
A.3.5 Proposition 1.5.4
The proof is isomorphic to the proof in proposition 5.2, except the changing of the discount




A.4 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Calibrated Parameters, The Standard Model
Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ω 1.455 Labor supply elasticity parameter
r¯∗ 1.041/4 − 1 Risk free world interest rate
d¯ 4.0495 IDEIR parameter
ψ 0.0000335 Elasticity of r∗t with respect to debt adjustment
β 0.9902 Subjective discount factor
η 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between T and NT goods
χτ 0.3 Preference bias toward the tradable good
α 0.25 Capital share of nontradable good production
θ 0.7 Calvo-Yun parameter
µ 6 Elasticity of substitution across NT intermediaries
τ p -0.2 Production Tax Rate (Subsidy)
ϕ 0.5432 Fixed cost of production in NT sector
y¯τ 1 Tradable endowment in the steady state
φ 0.1 Elasticity of costly capital adjustment
ρy 0.79 Persistence of the log endowment shock
ρr 0.87 Persistence of the log foreign interest rate shock
σy 0.0351 Standard deviation of the log endowment shock
σr 0.0026 Standard deviation of the log foreign interest rate shock
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Table A.2: Calibrated Parameters, The AB Model
Parameter Value Description
σa 2 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Arbitrageurs
σb 2 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Borrowers
ω 1.455 Labor supply elasticity parameter
r¯∗ 1.041/4 − 1 Risk free world interest rate
d¯ 4.0495 IDEIR parameter
ψ 0.00335 Elasticity of r∗t with respect to debt adjustment
βa 0.9902 Subjective discount factor, Arbitrageurs
βb 0.9764 Subjective discount factor, Borrowers
η 0.5 Elasticity of substitution between T and NT goods
χτ 0.3 Preference bias toward the tradable good
α 0.25 Capital share of nontradable good production
θ 0.7 Calvo-Yun parameter
µ 6 Elasticity of substitution across NT intermediaries
τ p -0.2 Production Tax Rate (Subsidy)
ϕ 0.4859 Fixed cost of production in NT sector
y¯τb 1 Tradable endowment in the steady state, Arbitrageurs
y¯τ 1 Tradable endowment in the steady state, Borrowers
φ 0.1 Elasticity of costly capital adjustment
ρy 0.79 Persistence of the log endowment shock
ρr 0.87 Persistence of the log foreign interest rate shock
σy 0.0351 Standard deviation of the log endowment shock
σr 0.0026 Standard deviation of the log foreign interest rate shock
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Figure A.1: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Increase in Tradable Endowment (I)
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Figure A.2: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Increase in Tradable Endowment (II)
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Figure A.3: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Decrease in Foreign Interest Rate (I)
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Figure A.4: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Decrease in Foreign Interest Rate (II)
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Figure A.5: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Increase in Tradable Endowment (I), The AB
Model
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Figure A.6: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Increase in Tradable Endowment (II), The AB
Model







Annual Real Interest Rate
































































Capital Price in Tradables

















Figure A.7: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Decrease in Foreign Interest Rate (I), The AB
Model
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Figure A.8: Impulse Response Functions, 1% Decrease in Foreign Interest Rate (II), The
AB Model
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Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: List of Countries, Periods and Number of Observations of the CLS and the TLS
Country Periods Obs. Country Periods Obs.
EMs (26)
Armenia 1994-2009 16 Lithuania 1995-2011 17
Azerbaijan 1992-2010 19 Mexico 1993-2011 19
Belarus 1995-2010 15 Micronesia 1995-2010 16
Bolivia 1992-2007 16 Moldova 1995-2010 16
Brazil 1995-2009 15 Poland 1995-2011 17
China 1992-2009 18 Portugal 1995-2012 18
Colombia 1994-2010 17 Romania 1995-2009 15
Czech 1993-2011 19 Slovakia 1995-2011 17
Estonia 1996-2011 16 Slovenia 1995-2011 17
Hungary 1995-2011 17 South Africa 1995-2011 17
Kazakhstan 1994-2010 17 Spain 1995-2011 17
Kyrgyz Rep 1994-2010 17 Tunisia 1992-2008 17
Latvia 1994-2011 18 Ukraine 1993-2008 16
Mean 17
ADVs (13)
Austria 1995-2011 17 Luxembourg 1995-2009 15
Belgium 1985-2011 27 Netherland 1980-2011 32
Denmark 1981-2011 31 Norway 1978-2012 35
Finland 1975-2011 36 Sweden 1995-2010 16
France 1975-2011 36 United Kingdom 1987-2011 25




Table B.2: List of Countries, Periods and Number of Observations of the TLS in EMs
Country Periods Obs. Country Periods Obs.
40 EMs
Argentina 1993-2007 15 Lithuania 1995-2008 14
Armenia 1994-2008 15 Mexico 1981-2008 28
Azerbaijan 1994-2008 15 Micronesia 1995-2008 14
Bahrain 1992-2008 17 Moldova 1995-2008 14
Belarus 1995-2008 14 Namibia 1989-2008 20
Bolivia 1992-2007 16 Peru 1986-2006 21
Brazil 1992-2007 16 Philippines 1992-2007 16
Chile 1981-2007 27 Poland 1995-2008 14
China 1992-2008 17 Portugal 1995-2008 14
Colombia 1992-2007 16 Romania 1995-2008 14
Costa Rica 1982-2007 26 Russia 1995-2008 14
Czech 1992-2008 17 Slovakia 1995-2008 14
Egypt 1996-2006 11 Slovenia 1995-2008 14
Estonia 1995-2008 14 South Africa 1981-2008 28
Hungary 1995-2008 14 South Korea 1981-2008 28
India 1981-2002 22 Taiwan 1981-2008 28
Israel 1995-2007 14 Thailand 1981-2008 28
Kazakhstan 1994-2008 15 Tunisia 1992-2008 17
Kyrgyz Rep 1994-2008 15 Turkey 1981-2006 26
Latvia 1994-2008 15 Ukraine 1993-2008 16
Mean 18
18 EMs
Argentina 1993-2007 15 Israel 1995-2007 14
Brazil 1992-2007 16 Mexico 1981-2008 28
Chile 1981-2007 27 Peru 1986-2006 21
Colombia 1992-2007 16 Philippines 1992-2007 16
Costa Rica 1982-2007 26 Poland 1991-2008 18
Czech 1992-2008 17 Russia 1995-2008 14
Egypt 1996-2006 11 South Africa 1981-2008 28
Hungary 1995-2008 14 South Korea 1981-2008 28




Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium














































− CTt − ptCNt
−ξTt
(
KTt+1 − (1− δ)KTt




















And stationary competitive equilibrium of the economy is the sequence of {ct, cTt , cNt , iTt , iNt ,
hTt , h
N
















































+ (1− αT )




























 1σN−1 , (C.6)








































































































































































subject to initial conditions of endogenous state variables {kT−1, kN−1, d−1} and sequence of
exogenous shocks {aTt , aNt , ξTt , ξNt , r∗t , νt, st}∞t=0.
C.2 Proof
C.2.1 Lemma 3.3.1
By the optimization condition of the firm, the rental rate of physical capital in the tradable






















































and then labor share in the tradable sector becomes
sh,Tt ≡ 1− sk,Tt =
1− αT




















































sh,Nt ≡ 1− sk,Nt =
1− αN




















, the proof is
trivial. 
C.2.3 Lemma 3.3.3
Since sˆh,jt = M
j θˆjt and M
j is a constant, it is straightfoward to derive equations (3.45)-(3.46)
by using properties of the correlation coefficient and the variance. 
C.2.4 Proposition 3.3.4
By the functional form of log-linearized aggregate share sˆht in equation (3.48), it is straight-
forward to derive equations (3.49)-(3.50) by using properties of the correlation coefficient
and the variance. 
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C.3 Estimation Procedure
C.3.1 Transforming Model Variables with Constant Price Index
In the model, all variables are represented by the tradable good. The original form of output
and consumption in terms of the final good are


















where P ct is the consumer price index (CPI). If we divide both sides with P
T
t , the two











where pt is the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables which is already denoted,
and pct is a relative CPI in terms of tradables. Given the market clearing condition of
nontradables cNt = y
N
t , the CPI is derived by solving the maximization problem of a CES




























In the WDI data, all variables are measured in constant prices, namely by dividing variables
by the GDP deflator. The GDP deflator is a Paasche index, which is a ratio between current
and constant price GDP. The formula for aggregate ouput measured in constant price is




























Then the model variables for output and consumption are transformed with respect to a














and investment is same (since it is measured one price)
iot = it (C.31)
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C.3.2 Bayesian Estimation using Markov Chain Monte Carlo with
Random-Walk Metropolis-Hastings Sampler
Let’s denote ZT = {Zt}Tt=1 as a vector of observables given by sample. Let p(θ) be the prior
distribution of parameters, L(ZT |θ) the likelihood function of observables to be evaluated
via Kalman filter, and p(θ|ZT ) the posterior distribution of parameters. Bayes’ theorem
gives






p(θ)L(ZT |θ) dθ is a scale factor. The scale factor may not be expressed
in closed form and can be difficult to estimate numerically. We should apply posterior
sampling to approach the accurate posterior distribution p(θ|ZT ), when available information
is only p(θ)L(ZT |θ). For posterior simulation, I use the iterative Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm.
The idea of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (hereafter MCMC) is to generate a serially









to the posterior density p(θ|ZT ). To construct the Markov chain, I apply the random walk
Metropolis-Hastings (hereafter RW-MH) algorithm as a posterior sampler. Given i− 1th
draw θi−1, the RW-MH proposes draw θ∗ for ith by following the random walk process
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θ∗ = θi−1 + c ·  (C.35)






where q(θ∗|θi−1) is a proposed density which follows the multivariate normal distribution
N(θi−1, c2Σ). Finally, the RW-MH draws a random number u ∼ U(0, 1). It accepts the
proposed draw θ∗ and sets θi = θ∗ if and only if
u < rp(θ
∗|θi−1). (C.37)
It rejects the proposed draw and set θi = θi−1 otherwise.
To match the targeted acceptance rate of the posterior simulation, I implement two-
stage RW-MH procedure. In the first stage, I set starting value of covariance matrix Σ0 to
be identity matrix, set starting value of scaling factor c0 = 0.01, and set initialize starting
values of parameters θ0 to be prior means, except for σT and σN . I set the starting values
of σT and σN to be 1 both, which represent the Cobb-Douglas production functions. The
covariance matrix Σ and its scaling factor c of proposal distribution are set to match the
targeted acceptance rate in the first stage iteration. Using estimated Σˆ and cˆ from the first
stage, the second stage iteration generates draws of parameters with starting values of θ˜,
which is a posterior mean of parameters from the first stage iteration. I set the targeted




(1) Real GDP: World Development Indicators (WDI). Indicator code: NY.GDP.PCAP.KN
(2) Real consumption expenditure: WDI. Indicator code: NE.CON.PETC.ZS
(3) Real investment: WDI. Indicator code: NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS
(4) Trade balance to output ratio: Own calculation, based on WDI statistics for
imports and exports of goods and services. Indicator codes: NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS,
NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS
(5) Aggregate labor share: OECD database. Indicator name: Labor Share Ratios
(6) Share of tradable sector: Own calculation, based on UNCTAD statistics for value
added in agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, industry, and GDP.
• Mexico:
(1) Real GDP: World Development Indicators (WDI). Indicator code: NY.GDP.PCAP.KN
(2) Real consumption expenditure: WDI. Indicator code: NE.CON.PETC.ZS
(3) Real investment: WDI. Indicator code: NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS
(4) Trade balance to output ratio: Own calculation, based on WDI statistics for
imports and exports of goods and services. Indicator codes: NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS,
NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS
(5) Aggregate labor share: OECD database. Indicator name: Labor Share Ratios
(6) Share of tradable sector: Own calculation, based on UNCTAD statistics for value
added in agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, industry, and GDP.
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C.5 Model 2: Two sectors with Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions
Table C.1: Marginal Prior and Posterior Distributions for Structural Parameters, Model 2
Model 2 Canada Mexico
Parameter Prior Posterior
Median [5%, 95 %] Median [5%, 95 %]
Endogenous Propagation Parameters
φT Uniform [0, 8] 2.57 [0.57, 4.64] 4.56 [2.15, 7.43]
φN Uniform [0, 8] 6.64 [4.57, 7.82] 2.77 [1.44, 6.61]
ψ Uniform [0, 10] 5.80 [2.41, 9.54] 0.70 [0.17, 3.06]
Exogenous Shock Parameters
ρa,T Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.73 [0.59, 0.81] 0.89 [0.79, 0.93]
σa,T Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.03 [0.02, 0.04] 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]
ρa,N Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.38 [-0.67, 0.93] 0.98 [0.97, 0.99]
σa,N Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.002 [0.0002, 0.007] 0.03 [0.02, 0.04]
ρξ,T Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.55 [0.27, 0.73] 0.57 [-0.74, 0.97]
σξ,T Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.14 [0.08, 0.18] 0.02 [0.002, 0.06]
ρξ,N Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.18 [-0.74, 0.83] 0.11 [-0.77, 0.95]
σξ,N Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.06 [0.008, 0.16] 0.01 [0.001, 0.05]
ρs Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.29 [-0.70, 0.91] 0.33 [-0.65, 0.92]
σs Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.003 [0.0004, 0.01] 0.004 [0.0005, 0.01]
ρν Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.93 [0.87, 0.96] 0.87 [-0.11, 0.93]
σν Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.14 [0.09, 0.19] 0.14 [0.007, 0.19]
ρµ Uniform [−0.99, 0.99] 0.69 [-0.47, 0.95] 0.88 [0.76, 0.96]
σµ Uniform [0, 0.2] 0.03 [0.009, 0.06] 0.04 [0.01, 0.13]
Note. All prior distributions are uniform. Posterior distributions are based on draws from the last 1 million
draws from 10 million MCMC chain.
159
Table C.2: Second Moments: Data and Model 2
Canada Mexico

































4.07 2.81 3.06 3.15









4.15 2.29 2.42 1.80
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0.93 0.89 0.91 0.82
Note. Standard deviations are measured in percentage points. The prediction is based on the posterior
median from the last 1 million draws from 10 million MCMC chain.
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Table C.3: Decomposition of Variances, Baseline Model
sh gY gC gI TB/Y γT
Canada
Neutral technologies
tradable sector 0.50 3.80 0.68 12.8 0.38 0.17
nontradable sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Marginal Efficiencies of Investment
tradable sector 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.29 0.08 0.00
nontradable sector 75.5 76.4 85.5 44.4 83.8 92.3
Country premium 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Preference 2.25 2.70 1.93 40.8 15.5 1.20
Labor supply 21.7 17.0 11.8 0.20 0.10 6.21
Measurement error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00
Mexico
Neutral technologies
tradable sector 0.01 0.03 0.003 0.02 0.002 0.02
nontradable sector 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.006 0.001 0.02
Marginal Efficiencies of Investment
tradable sector 0.004 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02
nontradable sector 99.3 70.7 56.7 87.6 72.2 88.3
Country premium 0.51 28.8 42.8 12.1 27.7 11.4
Preference 0.01 0.30 0.39 0.09 0.03 0.15
Labor supply 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Measurement error 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.002
Note. All measures are percentages. The prediction is based on the posterior median from the last 1 million
draws from 10 million MCMC chain.
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Table C.4: Decomposition of Variances, Model 2
Model 2 sh gY gC gI TB/Y γT
Canada
Neutral technologies
tradable sector 1.90 16.3 3.17 15.1 0.77 1.91
nontradable sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Marginal Efficiencies of Investment
tradable sector 26.5 44.2 23.2 76.9 92.2 26.6
nontradable sector 0.07 1.10 1.12 0.03 0.01 0.07
Country premium 0.07 0.20 0.68 4.50 1.14 0.07
Preference 70.7 38.0 71.7 2.79 5.78 70.9
Labor supply 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Measurement error 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.34
Mexico
Neutral technologies
tradable sector 0.17 11.3 1.05 14.0 0.57 3.51
nontradable sector 0.02 10.7 5.31 1.36 0.16 0.44
Marginal Efficiencies of Investment
tradable sector 0.02 0.89 1.73 0.10 0.92 0.52
nontradable sector 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
Country premium 0.46 10.6 17.9 56.2 87.1 9.29
Preference 4.31 66.3 73.8 28.1 11.1 85.4
Labor supply 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Measurement error 94.9 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.71
Note. All measures are percentages. The prediction is based on the posterior median from the last 1 million
draws from 10 million MCMC chain.
Table C.5: The Elasticity of Capital-Labor Substitution of the Economy, Alternative Models
σˆ Canada Mexico
Model 2 1.03 1.01
Note. The first and second columns in row ’Model 2’ show estimates based on regressions with simulated data
from estimated models. The estimates from models are all statistically significant at 1 percent significance
level. On the other hand, the two columns in row ’Model 3’ show median of marginal posterior of σ. Posterior
distribution is based on draws from the last 1 million draws from 10 million MCMC chain.
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